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REINVIGORATING EDUCATIONAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: A
REPRESENTATIONAL FOCUS
John G. Culhane*
Abstract: For the past twenty tears, courts have faced a wide array of claims alleging
misconduct by schools and their officials. These claims have involved diverse injuries,
including: negligence in permitting functional illiterates to pass through the school system;
negligent misdiagnosis of learning disabilities; and failure to deliver a promised package of
educational skills and services.
The judiciary has almost uniformly refused to allow recovery, in tort or otherwise, for
such injuries. Some courts have conceded that, on the pleadings, a good case might be
made out. Plaintiffs have nonetheless been turned away because of courts' related concerns with untrammeled litigation and with invading the province of the legislative and
administrative bodies charged with operating the schools.
This Article adopts the position that such a wastebasket approach to claims of educational injury is unjustified, and should be abandoned. The Article first attempts to sort out
the various kinds of cases that courts have treated identically. It then proposes that a
proper focus on the kinds of representations made in the educational setting, and plaintiff's sometimes forced reliance on those representations, can aid in the resolution of these
disputes without justifying judicial fears. This emphasis on representation and reliance is
justified through an examination of the role that representational notions play in other
areas of tort law.
Armed with the ordnance of representation, the Article then reconsiders a wide range of
educational malpractice cases, suggesting approaches and solutions to problems that have
thus far evaded principled analysis.
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The objects of... primaryeducation.., would be... To enable [every
citizen] to calculatefor himself, and to express and preserve his ideas
... in writing; To improve, by reading, his morals and faculties; To
understand his duties to his neighbors and country, and to discharge

with competence the functions confided to him by either; To know his
rights; To exercise with order andjustice those he retains... ; And, in
general, to observe with intelligence andfaithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be placed.
Thomas Jefferson'
-

I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson could not have predicted that, almost two hundred years after expressing these aspirations, the promise of public
education would remain unfulfilled. Every year, thousands of students
at the threshold of adulthood are graduated from high school lacking
basic literacy.2 As the number of such students has increased, so too
has the number of lawsuits filed against public and private educational
institutions and those who work for them. With one voice, courts
1. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Report of the Commissionersfor the University of Virginia, in PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE PAPERS, 131, 133 (Vintage Books 1990).
2. The problem of illiteracy is of pandemic proportions, but attempts to fix the number of
illiterates have met with limited success. In 1982, a Census Bureau study found that between 17
and 21 million adults are illiterate in English. 13% of Adults Can't Read Plain English, US.
Tests Find, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1986, at 6. In 1985, the National Assessment of Educational
Progress assessed the literacy skills of America's young adults, and the results were distressing.
The study found that "only" 10 million adults were illiterate, but that 36 million could not read
at an eighth-grade level, and that a total of 70 million could not ree.d
at an eleventh-grade level.
Jonathan Kozol, Illiteracy Statistics:A Numbers Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1986, at 31. The
study also found that adults had problems performing simple tasks that require the most basic
literacy: 80 percent could not read a bus schedule or calculate a tip in a restaurant; and 40
percent could not follow map directions. Id.
Part of the problem in fixing a number is definitional. Until recently, illiteracy was measured
by reference to grade level completed. Experts now recognize, however, that such a barometer
provides no reliable indication of whether one can actually read. Cf., 13% ofAdults Can't Read
Plain English, U.S. Tests Find, supra (quoting Robert Barnes, supervisor of Census Study, who
blamed illiteracy in part on "longtime school policies of grade promotion based on age").
Further, what does it mean to say that one can "read"? If the focus is on the ability to make
effective use of the types of information with which one is confronted daily, the estimated
number of illiterates will be higher than if the question is whether the most basic reading skills
have been acquired. See Kozol, supra.
By whatever means the measurement is taken, it is obvious that illiteracy is a grave national
problem. Alexis de Toqueville may have been the first to observe that, because of the unique role
of American courts in deciding constitutional questions, every issue of enough significance to
generate laws will soon be subject to "the searching analysis of the judicial power." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 85 (1966). We shall see that the very pervasivenes of
illiteracy should, under the principles of representation, make recovery for this subset of
educational malpractice claims more difficult.
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have turned plaintiffs away, declining to find a cause of action for
functional illiteracy.3
Illiteracy, however, is but one of a host of more-or-less related
problems arising in the educational setting that has given rise to litigation. Another common allegation centers on the negligence of school
personnel in diagnosing learning disabilities.4 Less frequent are suits
alleging that an institution's negligence has injured a third party. For
3. An early, often-cited case denying a cause of action for educational malpractice based on a
claim of functional illiteracy is Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854
(Ct. App. 1976). Since that time, courts have consistently blocked any claims raising
"educational malpractice" issues, whether based on claims of functional illiteracy, or otherwise.
See, eg., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990); D.S.W. v. Fairbanks
North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Tubell v. Dade County Pub. Schs.,
419 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Rich ex rel Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc., 793
S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); Doe v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982); Hunter v.
Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y.
1979); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982); Helm v. Professional
Children's Sch., 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Donohue v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 408
N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 391 N.E.2d 1352
(N.Y. 1979); Poe v. Hamilton, 565 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Wilson v. Continental
Insur. Co., 274 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. 1979). But see B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982)
(claim stated under state constitution); Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd,
475 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1984). B.M. and Snow represent less than full victory. In B.M., the
Montana Supreme Court later upheld the lower court's entry of summary judgment against
plaintiff, on the ground that the student and her guardian had admitted that the educational
malpractice had caused no damage. B.M. ex reL Berger v. State, 698 P.2d 399 (Mont. 1985). As
the dissent pointed out, the holding was in error, because the student was required to repeat one
year at school, regressed developmentally, and suffered emotional harm. Ad at 402 (Hunt, J.,
dissenting). Snow v. State is discussed in detail infra part IV.A. Here, it suffices to note that the
court of appeals allowed the judgment in favor of plaintiff to stand because it characterized the
case as involving medical, as opposed to educational, malpractice.
The above cases are cited together because the courts treat them all as arising under the rubric
of "educational malpractice." As I shall argue, the courts' failure to distinguish between very
different types of cases has led to injustice.
4. Claims of functional illiteracy typically call into question a school's ability to provide a
competent program of instruction, while misdiagnosis claims attempt to tie the injury to specific
negligent acts or omissions. In the latter class of cases, the complaint may allege that a test,
perhaps administered by a psychologist, was either incompetently given, or that the results of the
test (and the attendant recommendations of the psychologist) were simply ignored. See, eg., Doe
v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814, 816 (Md. 1982); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317,
319 (N.Y. 1979). Other claims allege that a particular type of learning disability was not
diagnosed, and that the student was therefore permitted to languish in an inappropriate
classroom setting. See, eg., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554,
554 (Alaska 1981). It may also be alleged that a misplacement subjected the child to ridicule,
mental anguish or a damaging loss of ego. See, eg., B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
Cases arising under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988), may allege
that the district's refusal to fund the child's placement was wrongful, so that reimbursement is
required. See Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal.
1982).
As the above suggests, the line between the two sets of claims is not at all distinct. Judicial fear
of starting down the dreaded "slippery slope" has caused courts to classify all such claims under

Washington Law Review

Vol. 67:349, 1992

example, a medical school has produced uninformed doctors who then
injure others. With similarly impressive uniformity, courts have
rejected these claims as well.' All of the foregoing cases are typically
classified under the rubric of "educational malpractice."
Judicial homogeneity, always surprising, is even more so in this
class of cases because commentators have been almost as united on the
other side of the question, and have called for recognition of the tort of
educational malpractice.6 Such a pronounced division invites speculathe heading "educational malpractice," thereby eliding the impcrtant distinctions between
particular cases.
5. See, eg., Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986); Swidryk v. Saint Michael's
Medical Ctr., 493 A.2d 641 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
6. Commentators, by and large, employ a traditional negligence analysis in concluding that
claims for educational malpractice should at least be recognized. See, eg., Terrence D.
Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine to the Teaching Profession, 11 J.L. & EDuc. 479,
498-501 (1982) (recognizing that the most difficult problem involves establishing causation,
especially where the claim is for functional illiteracy); John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for
the EducationalHarms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 641,
694-745 (1978) (thoroughly examining the issue of duty, concluding that educators should be
held to a professional standard of care); Robert H. Jerry II, Recovery in Tort for Educational
Malpractice:Problems of Theory andPolicy, 29 KAN. L. REv. 195 (1981) (canvassing cases and
deciding that judicial refusal to recognize a cause of action cannot be reconciled with general tort
principles, and that denial of such claims should come from the legislature, if at all); Gershon M.
Ratner, A New LegalDutyfor Urban PublicSchool. Effective Educationin Basic Skill; 63 TEx.
L. REv. 777 (1985) (arguing that duty is that of a reasonable educator, and that causation can be
demonstrated by comparing the education given to what other students were receiving; article
also argues that characteristics of successful schools can be, and have been, identified). But see
Richard Funston, EducationalMalpractice:A Cause ofEducation in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 743 (1981) (expressing doubt that duty, causation, or damages could be
established for educational malpractice claims). The problem has not gone unnoticed in other
common law countries. See, eg., William F. Foster, EducationalMalpractice:A Tort for the
Untaught?, 19 U.B.C. L. REV. 161, 217-28 (1985) (finding debate over whether educators
qualify as professionals to be beside the point, finding it clear that they possess skills and
knowledge that laypersons do not); Ian M. Ramsey, EducationalNegligence and the Legalisation
of Education, 11 U.N.S.W. L.J. 184 (1988) (balanced assessment of the advantages and
drawbacks to recognizing the cause of action, with attention given to the differences between the
kinds of events that give rise to educational malpractice claims).
The topic has also spawned a number of student comments, taking both sides on the question.
See, e.g., Joan Blackburn, Comment, Educational Malpractice: W7hen Can Johnny Sue?, 7
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117, 133-35 (1978) (arguing against general recognition of educational
malpractice, but suggesting that a proper case of negligent misrepresentation should be permitted
to proceed); Karim H. Calavenna, Comment, EducationalMalpractice, 64 U. DET. L. REv. 717
(1987) (rejecting educational malpractice claims, in part because they might discourage
potentially good teachers from entering the profession); Deborah Dye, Note, Education
Malpractice: A Cause of Action That Failed to Pass the Test, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 499 (1987)
(rejecting the tort in favor of administrative remedies); Daryl Andrew Nelson, Comment,
EducationalMalpractice, 4 GEo. MASON U. L. Rav. 261 (1981) (arguing that the benefits of the
cause of action outweigh the costs); Destin Shann Tracy, Comment, EducationalNegligence: A
Student's Cause of Action for Incompetent Academic Instruction, 58 N.C. L. REV. 561 (1980)
(suggesting a limited right of action); Edward J. Wallison, Jr., Note, NonliabilityforNegligence
in the Public Schools-EducationalMalpracticefrom Peter W. to Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME L.
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tion: Why has the judiciary been unresponsive to what appear to be
effective point-by-point refutations of the arguments typically
advanced in denying recovery?
Two related problems have created this blockade. First, courts fear
that application of traditional negligence doctrine to the educational
setting will result in an unprincipled growth of claims, because the
interrelated problems of pedagogy, testing, and student motivation (to

name the most obvious) are so difficult to analyze in any systematic
way. This perception stems, at least in part, from the other problem;
courts consistently fail to distinguish between vastly different cases.
The tendency to fuse virtually all claims arising in the educational
context-through the simple expedient of labelling them all "educational malpractice"-both masks important distinctions between the
cases and allows wholesale (and unprincipled) judicial rejection of
them.7
One could argue that too much has already been written on this
subject, given that courts have continued to turn a deaf ear to commentators' calls for recognition of the tort.' My purpose here, howREv. 814 (1980) (criticizing decided cases as placing too much weight on the context, and not
enough on the merits of the claim); Kimberly A. Wilkins, Comment, EducationalMalpractice A
Cause of Action in Need of a Call For Action, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 427 (1988) (suggesting that
legislative action may be required, since the courts have been consistently unreceptive).
7. That the judicial mission should be to seek integrity in law has been perhaps most
eloquently stated by Ronald Dworkin, who stated that judges must examine the precedent cases
for principles into which the presenting case can be woven, and should generally decide cases
within the (hazy) legal body they are able to discern. RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE
239-50 (1986) (applying this principle to a case involving recovery for emotional distress). Even
if this principle is applied in its simplest formulation-without taking account of situations in
which the judge can extract only limited guidance from the decided cases-it is obvious that
courts have been wrong in systematically denying recovery to victims of educational malpractice.
As this Article demonstrates, and as at least one court has admitted, any reasonable application
of settled negligence principles would allow recovery in many cases. See Donohue v. Union Free
Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353-54 (N.Y. 1979).
8. Yet the time seems ripe for a fresh examination of the issue, given that courts continue to
be confronted with claims of educational malpractice, contrary precedent notwithstanding.
Within little more than the past year, a new spate of decisions have been issued, all but one of
which continued the almost uniform practice of outright rejection of claims for deficient
education. See, eg., Bishop v. Indiana Technical Vocational College, 742 F. Supp. 524 (N.D.
Ind. 1990) (refusing to recognize claim for educational malpractice under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (rejecting claim of former student,
recruited as basketball player, who claimed that he should not have been admitted, because the
school knew that he would be unable to perform college-level work); Howell v. Waterford Pub.
Schs., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (interpreting § 504 of the Education of the
Handicapped Act and Rehabilitation Act not to create "general tort liability for educational
malpractice"); Rich ex rel Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App.
1990) (upholding summary judgment in parents' suit for breach of contract and educational
malpractice against private school that had not acted on recommendation of psychologist chosen
by parents; court relying extensively on New York and California precedent); Poe v. Hamilton,
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ever, is not to reiterate what courts already know: Such claims are
supported by traditional negligence principles. Instead, I argue that
judicial attention should be directed at the often-overlooked role of
representations, which suffuse the law of torts. Due emphasis on the
representations made in the educational setting, and on parents' and
students' reliance on those representations, can allow sensible distinctions between cases that courts have uncritically equated. These distinctions should be useful to courts in the search for just results.
This Article begins by briefly reviewing the possible sources of duty,
which, when breached, could support a claim for educational malpractice. In so doing, it also of necessity discusses the crippling limitations
imposed by the judiciary on each suggested basis of duty. This Article
does not attempt to show that the duty to provide a certain education
can be derived from any of several different sources. Rather, it suggests that the particular source of the duty may have significance
under a representational analysis.
Part III explores this representational notion. Both products liability law and the law of professional liability are looked to as instances
of the central, but usually unstated, position that representational
principles play in tort law. These principles provide a powerful lens
through which to view the related questions of reliance, causation, and
the positions and power of all players: the student, the educational
institution, and the parents.
Using this representational focus as a kind of lighthouse, this Article then revisits and examines in some detail the existing jurisprudence
in educational malpractice cases. Due attention to the representations
present in those cases, part IV argues, can assist ccurts in making principled determinations. Indeed, many judges have imparted this focus
to the facts before them without expressly acknowledging their representational color.
In part V, this Article moves from cases brought under common
law negligence to cases involving the application of statutes, and decisions involving claims that negligence in the educational process
caused injury to third parties. The aim is to show that the representational orientation can provide a useful tool for working through these
565 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (court listing a host of reasons for disallowing high school
student's claim that teacher had been negligent in administering fewer than the promised number
of quizzes, including immunity, presumptive failure to demonstrate causation, and public policy
against recognizing educational malpractice claims). But see Malone v. Academy of Court
Reporting, Nos. 90AP-264, 90AP-430, 1990 WL 250496 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1990)
(dismissing reversal where plaintiffs suing paralegal school proceeded under breach of contract
and misrepresentation, not under educational malpractice in tort).
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cases and, by extension, others in which the educational system has
somehow malfunctioned.
II. SOURCES OF DUTY
Claims alleging failure on the part of a school system to provide an
adequate education have been part of the judicial landscape for almost
two decades now. Recovery, however, has been a different matter.
Plaintiffs typically find themselves turned out of court by a threshold
determination that the defendant school system and its employees owe
no enforceable duty to provide an education. 9 Only those cases
decided under federal statutes have disclosed a consistent exception to
this blanket approach.10
As with any other class of claims, educational malpractice actions
have proceeded under a number of different theories, each of which
bears a signature duty. A statute expressly affording a private right of

action, of course, is the preferred vehicle, since it announces its own
duty. It is therefore not surprising that cases decided under federal
statutes, such as the Education of the Handicapped Act, that expressly
authorize judicial recourse and remedy, have granted (admittedly limited) relief in appropriate cases.'"
Another promising strategy is to argue that constitutional and statutory provisions that do not expressly provide a private right of action
nonetheless create a duty running from defendant to plaintiff. 2 There
9. See supra note 3. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976), discussed infra, provides the most comprehensive statement of the "no duty"
argument.
10. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dep't of
Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987). As we will see, the
more interesting question is whether the statutes may fairly be interpreted to permit recovery of
money damages (and if so, to what extent) by those who have been wronged by an erroneous
placement or assessment.
11. The Supreme Court has made clear that, under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1410-85 (1988), courts are empowered to order school authorities to reimburse
parents for their expenditures on private school education if the court decides that such
placement is proper under the Act. Burlington School Comm., 471 U.S. at 359. In a unanimous
decision, the Court held that the statutory directive to courts to "grant such relief as [they]
determine is appropriate," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), authorizes such reimbursement. Burlington
School Comm, 471 U.S. at 369. But this holding leaves many questions unanswered. See infra
part V.A.
12. Following hornbook principles, courts read a given statute as fixing a standard of care
only where certain requirements have been meet. First, the statute must be determined to be for
the benefit of a particular class of individuals, rather than for the benefit of the state or of the
community. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at
222-23 (5th ed. 1984). Once that threshold has been cleared, plaintiffs must also show that they
were in the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted, and that the harm suffered
fell within the risk against which the statute was enacted to guard. Id. at 224-25.
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are at least two problems with this approach. First, the constitutional
provisions, at least, are so broadly drafted that they can fairly be read
as expressing a general goal of public policy, rather than as conferring
specifically enforceable rights.13 Courts typically read such provisions
unsympathetically. 14 A second, and related problem, is that courts
reluctant to recognize a claim for educational malpractice in the first
place are not likely to be persuaded otherwise by a statute that they

can choose not to apply.15
Another possible source of duty is contract. As with statutory duty,
recovery under a contract theory holds promise where courts can identify a specific undertaking to deliver a certain educational "package;"
a possibility in the private school context. 6 By contrast, implied contract claims have been infrequent and jurally disfavored. 7
13. None of the state constitutional provisions referring to education are highly specific. See
infra part II.B.
14. See eg., Oleszczuk v. State, 604 P.2d 637, 641 (Ariz. 1979) (stating "the more specific and
narrow the duty required by the statute, the more likely it is that the duty has been narrowed
from a general duty to the public to a specific duty to an individual," the court denied the claim
against the state, that had issued a driver's license to a known epileptic).
15. A good example of this treatment is Daniel B. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 581
F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wis. 1984). The court allowed the claim for declaratory relief, arising under
the Education of the Handicapped Act, to survive, but rejected a claim for money damages under
that Act. Also rejected were claims purportedly arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), for
violation of constitutional rights, and state law claims for intentional misrepresentation and
negligence. See infra part V.A.
16. The best chance for recovery under this theory involves claims against schools that
provide specific skills, as opposed to a general education. CompareMalone v. Academy of Court
Reporting, Nos. 90AP-264, 90AP-430, 1990 WL 250496 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1990)
(improper to dismiss claim against paralegal school that had allegedly breached express promises
to its students) with Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 873 (App. Div. 1982)
(entering summary judgment on behalf of private school that had allegedly failed to deliver a
promised level of education; court noted in dictum that the result might differ if the school had
failed to perform contractually specified services, such as providing a specific number of hours of
instruction).
17. Typically, the breach of implied contract claims have been yoked to negligence claims,
and the courts have summarily dismissed both. A good recent example of this approach is
apparent in Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1993). There, plaintiff student
had been recruited by defendant university to play basketball. The complaint alleged that
Creighton had acted negligently, and in breach of contract, both by admitting a student they
knew to be unable of doing college level work (he had scored 9 of 36 on the American College
Test, while the average Creighton student had scored 23.2 that same year) and by then failing to
provide substantial assistance that might have enabled him to "catch up." Id. at 1322-23. The
court, attempting to predict Illinois law, first rejected the claim for educational malpractice,
principally because of its perception that "in education, the ultimate responsibility for success
remains always with the student." Id. at 1328. The court then rejected the claim that the
university had breached its "'implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.'" Id. at 1331. In
effect, the court held that, absent a specific contractual promise that had been breached, no
action for breach of contract would survive. See also Poe v. Hamilton. 565 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990), where plaintiff who failed a psychology course, and was therefore unable to be
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But by far the most often-tested source of duty, because the most
flexible, has been common-law tort: negligence, or, on occasion, misrepresentation."8 Negligence doctrine seems particularly appealing,
but, as stated above, courts have choked off such claims by refusing,
for policy reasons, to recognize a duty to provide a non-negligent
education.
This section provides a brief overview of the various duties that
have been tested. For expository purposes, negligence law, which contains the bulk of cases, is treated first. The section then moves briskly
through constitutional law and statutory law, taking the Education of
the Handicapped Act as an example. Finally, it discusses the application of contract and misrepresentation theories to the educational malpractice context. Because the source of the duty selected is
subordinated to the representational theory proposed in Section III,
much of the discussion under any particular theory is deferred until
after the discussion of representation.
A.

JudicialBackground-Rejection of Negligence Theory

The earliest case to confront the issue of educational malpractice
involved a claim of functional illiteracy. In Peter W. v. San Francisco
Unified School District,9 a student who had received his high school
diploma from the defendant public school district was graduated with
the reading skills of a fifth-grader. Sounding in negligence, his complaint alleged that the educators involved had failed to " 'exercise that
degree of professional skill required of an ordinary prudent educator
under the same circumstances.' "20 The alleged acts of negligence
graduated with her class, claimed that, as a result of the teacher's failure to follow the board of
education's rules, she was unaware that she was having problems in the course. The court
dismissed both the negligence and the implied contractual claims for failure to demonstrate
causation and for vague "public policy" reasons. Id. at 889. The genesis of this rejection of
contract appears to be Torres v. Little Flower Children's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984),
cert denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985), discussed in detail infra part IV.B.
18. The early case of Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct.
App. 1976), see infra, notes 19-25 and accompanying text, featured a claim for negligent
misrepresentation, but the court dismissed that claim for the same public policy reasons that
caused it to reject the more general negligence claim. For a good, early discussion of the promise
of a negligent misrepresentation theory in the educational context, which focuses on the
reasonableness of reliance on representations, see Blackburn, supra note 6, at 132-37.
19. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976).
20. Id. at 856. Plaintiff based this claim upon a state statute that provided:
[W]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed
to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an
injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public
entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980).
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included, in sum: failure to detect plaintiff's problems and to assign
him to appropriate classes; permitting him both to advance from grade
to grade, and ultimately to be graduated, although he did not possess
the proper skills; 2 and assigning him to unqualified instructors.
Plaintiff sought damages for loss of earning capacity, inability to
obtain most types of employment, and the cost of compensatory
tutoring.
Inasmuch as the complaint sought recovery under a novel theory,
plaintiff attempted to persuade the court to recognize a duty running
from the school system and its employees to its students along three
related lines. First, teachers are public employees, who, by assuming
the discretionary function of education, accept a duty to instruct with
reasonable care. Second, a special relationship exists between students
and teachers that gives rise to a duty of care. Finally, plaintiff pointed
to the recognized duty to use reasonable care in instructing and supervising students in cases in which physical injury had resulted, and
urged the court to extend liability to non-physical injuries such as
functional illiteracy.2 2
Although the court rejected each of these proposed sources of duty
in turn, the central concern was with the "public policy considerations" militating against recognition of such a duty. After setting forth
the factors generally to be considered in deciding whether to recognize
a new duty, 23 the court proceeded to consider three concerns with
complaints based on functional illiteracy. First, it found no workable
standard of care for educators, as "the science of pedagogy itself is
fraught with different and conflicting theories of how or what a child
should be taught.",24 Next, the court noted the difficulty of proving
the causal connection between negligent conduct and injury. In so
21. The allegation that plaintiff was permitted to be graduated without the proper skills was
based upon CaliforniaEducation Code § 8573, which the plaintiff alleged created a mandatory
duty not to graduate students from high school without demonstration of proficiency in basic
skills. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862 n.5. That section has since been replaced by California Education
Code § 51217 (West 1989), that establishes proficiency in basic skills as a prerequisite to
graduation, and instructs the relevant secondary schools' board of education, within the
framework established by the State Board of Education, to prescribe -he required skills. As will
be discussed infra part III, such a provision may be relevant under the representational theory.
22. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
23. Those considerations were: the social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises,
compared with the risks of implementation; party relationship; workability of the rule in
prevention of injury; ability of the parties to bear or spread the financial burden of injury; the
relevant statutes and case law; the prophylactic effects of such a rule; the extension and limitation
of powers placed on a public agency defendant by the law and its budget; and moral
considerations of society. Id. at 859-60 (quoting Raymond v. Paradise Unified Sch. Dist., 31
Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (Ct. App. 1963)).
24. Id. at 860-61.
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doing, it cited factors outside the classroom such as physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, and environmental problems, all of which
might affect a student's performance. Finally, the court raised the
trusty "flood of litigation" worry.2 5
These arguments have been rejected, not only by commentators, but
by some later courts as well. In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
School District,2 6 for example, the New York Court of Appeals followed Peter W.'s holding in turning back a functional illiteracy claim,
brought under a negligence theory, but disagreed with much of the
California court's reasoning. The Donohue court found that, despite
the obvious difficulties, a plaintiff might indeed be able to demonstrate
that defendant caused his or her injury. It also noted that an applicable standard of care might be found.2 7 The claim was nonetheless
rejected because of the court's refusal to interfere with pedagogical
methods.28
In short, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that the California court's stated reasons for refusing to entertain such claims were
unsupportable, but still refused recovery. The New York court stated:
"[T]hat a complaint alleging 'educational malpractice' might on the
pleadings state a cause of action ...does not, however, require that it
be sustained. The heart of the matter is whether.., the courts should,
as a matter of public policy, entertain such claims. We believe they
29
should not."
Not constrained by the need to apply the results of their logic to
actual disputes, commentators have gone the extra step that Donohue
made inevitable, and have effectively and decisively refuted the substantive objections that courts have raised in denying recovery. The
25. Id. at 861.
26. 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979), aff'g 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1978), aff'g 408
N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
27. Id. at 1353-54.
28. As the court noted: "To entertain a cause of action for 'educational malpractice' would
require the courts not merely to make judgments as to the validity of broad educational policies
...but, more importantly, to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of these policies."
Id. at 1354. As we will see, recognition of a claim for educational malpractice does not require
courts to second-guess broad policy directives, and only requires "sitting in review" of specific
decisions when those decisions should, based on unexceptionable tort principles, be actionable.
See infra part IV.
29. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354. This result accords with Prosser's view that the law does
not provide redress simply on the basis of injury. Instead, courts have looked to a number of
considerations in deciding whether to provide a legal remedy. These include administrative
convenience, time constraints and the availability of an alternative remedy that would be equally
effective. KEETON et al., supra note 12, § 53.
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greatest concern has been with causation. As the California court
stated in Peter W.:
[T]he achievement of literacy in the schools, or its failure, are influenced
by a host of factors which affect the pupil subjectivel y, from outside the
formal teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers. They
may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they
may be present but not perceived, recognized but not identified.3 °
Causation problems are of course daunting in functional illiteracy
situations. But scholars have shown that even in those cases, it may be
possible to trace illiteracy to its origin. 31 Further, in only a small
number of cases have plaintiffs alleged that the school system's pervasive negligence so infected the educational process that illiteracy
resulted.32 Rather, the attempt has been to tie educational injury to
specific acts (or omissions) of negligence. In those cases, it is frivolous
to argue that causation cannot be established; most courts have not, in
fact, based dismissals on causal grounds. 3
Such a result is consistent with the law's general approach toward
causation. The presence of a host of factors, and the attendant difficulty of isolating the defendant's misconduct as a substantial source (if
not the only source) of injury recurs throughout tort law. Consider
toxic tort cases in which plaintiff must show that defendant's product,
and not other environmental factors, led to injury.34 Plaintiffs face a
substantial burden, and do not uniformly succeed on the causation
30. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1976)
(footnote omitted).
31. See, eg., Elson, supra note 6, at 746-54 (acknowledging that causation can indeed be the
most difficult element of an educational malpractice action to establish, but pointing out that
there are methods for determining causation, such as using expert testimony to demonstrate that
early deficiencies in education can have ripple effects, leading eventually to illiteracy when the
student is unable to comprehend what's being taught); Ratner, supra note 6, at 856-58 (on the
causation issue, plaintiffs should be afforded a rebuttable presumption by showing that they are
educable by relying on standardized test scores, that other schools are able to provide an
adequate education, and that they would have succeeded to a greater extent had their schools
been like other, demonstrably more successful schools).
32. Peter W. and Donohue.are the paradigmatic functional illiteracy cases.
33. For a straightforward judicial recognition that causation may be provable in the
educational injury context, see Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352,
1353 (N.Y. 1979) ("[W]hile [proximate causation] might indeed be difficult.., to prove in view
of the many collateral factors involved in the learning process, it perhaps assumes too much to
conclude that it could never be established.").
34. Innumerable pages of judicial opinions have been given over to discussions of cause-infact in toxic tort cases. E.g., Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), involved
a claim by 32 plaintiffs against defendant, the owner of a local plant that had emitted chemical
toxins into surrounding bodies of water and into the air. Defendant predictably argued that the
circumstantial evidence tending to link exposure to illness should not have enabled plaintiffs to
have reached the jury. Id at 177-79. Disagreeing, the Missouri Ccurt of Appeals noted that:
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question, but they are permitted to have their claims assessed on the
merits. At least insofar as causation is concerned, there is no reason
why the result in functional illiteracy cases should be different.3"
B.

ConstitutionalSources of Duty

The United States and state Constitutions might be considered
promising sources of a duty to supply an adequate education. The
U.S. Constitution, however, does not expressly provide the right to an
education, and the Supreme Court has provided no unequivocal indication that failure to provide even a minimal skill level offends the
Constitution.3 6 The Court has stated, however, that providing a public school education "ranks at the very apex of the function of a
State."3 7 Indeed, most state constitutions do expressly provide a right
to an education. 8
At least one state court has held that such a constitutional provision
gives rise to a private right of action for negligence. In B.M. v. State,3 9
plaintiff student was placed in a special education program for the
educable mentally retarded. Plaintiff's mother was not informed that
her child had been segregated from her peers until some nine weeks
after the fact. She promptly removed the child from the program, and
subsequently brought suit for negligence, both in misclassifying her
[The substantial factor test for causation-in-fact,] which ascribes liability to a cause which
has played an important part in the production of the harm, even though the harm may
have occurred absent that cause-is particularly suited to injury from chronic exposure to
toxic chemicals where the sequent manifestation of biological disease may be the result of a
confluence of causes."
Id. at 174. So, too, of educational malpractice; simply substitute "educational malpractice" for
"chronic exposure to toxic chemicals" and "educational injury" for "biological disease" in the
quoted passage above.
35. This Article shall have much more to say on the relation between causation and
representation. Here, the point is only to make the point that cause-in-fact may indeed be
possible to demonstrate.
36. In San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), plaintiffs challenged
the use of local property tax as a method of financing public school systems in Texas, claiming
that disparate incomes among residents of different school districts translated into
unconstitutional educational inequalities. One of the central bases for the constitutional claim
was that the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms requires education. Id. at 35. The
Court first stated that "education ... is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." Id.
The uncertainty as to whether the Court recognizes some right to a de minimus level of
education arises from the Court's later statement: "Even if it were conceded that some
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite ... we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that
falls short." Id. at 36-37.
37. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
38. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 814 n.138 (collecting constitutional provisions).
39. 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
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daughter and in segregating her from her classmates. The court found
that the state constitution, as implemented by various statutes relating
to both regular and special education, supported a duty of care. The
Montana Constitution provided that "[e]quality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state."'"
The Montana Constitution's declaration of educational goals is
among the stronger expressions of the right. Stopping short of a guarantee, other constitutions may require "promotion" of public education,4 ' or that the state legislature provide "a thorough and efficient"
public educational system,42 or (in language sounding least like rights
are being created) that the state provide free public education.43
One scholar argues that such statements should be construed as giving rise to private rights of action, inasmuch as they signal the state's
commitment to the educational mission.'
This approach would
deemphasize the general nature of the constitutional language, focusing instead on the state's announced policy of creating an educated
populace. The counterargument is that the provisions are too general
to be reasonably understood as giving rise to any rights at all.
A division of powers type of argument has also been invoked against
judicial involvement. Simply stated, the point is that the very state
legislatures that have established the constitutional "right" to an education have also charged state officials, primarily local school boards,
with educational policy decisions.45 Then, almost as a corollary, the
further point is made that to countenance educational malpractice
claims would be to permit judicial second-guessing of legislative and
administrative prerogative.4 6
40. Id. at 427 (citing MONT. CoNsT. art. x, § 1). The procedural posture in which the case
reached the court made it inappropriate to consider whether "that duty was breached here, and
assuming a breach, whether the child was injured by the breach of duty .... Id. The question
whether the child was injured by the breach of duty came to the fore later, when the case
returned to the Montana Supreme Court. The court then held that plaintiff had conceded that
no injury had resulted from the defendants' negligence. B.M. ex rel. Berger v. State, 698 P.2d
399 (Mont. 1985); see supra text accompanying note 3.
41. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 816 n.145.
42. See id.at 815, n.144.
43. See id.at n.143.
44. See id. at 814-51. Ratner suggests that both substantive due prcess and equal protection
grounds support recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice.
45. See Tracy, supra note 6, at 591 (one "rationale offered for judicial noninterference is the
constitutional and statutory delegation of educational matters to state and local administrative
bodies") (citing Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 1979)
for the proposition that to recognize educational malpractice would be to flout constitutional and
statutory commands that school administrative bodies run the school3).
46. This same argument has been made under several of the other theories used in an attempt
to support educational malpractice claims. One notable instance is negligence, where courts have
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This last point is a non sequitur. In the vast majority of cases,
courts are not second-guessing policy choices by whatever body is
charged with setting that policy; instead, they are considering a claim
that the policies in question were not carried out.4 7 Consider the negligent misdiagnosis cases for example. A child is tested for learning
disabilities and is said to suffer from mild retardation. The proper
administrative procedure might call for periodic retesting of the child,
perhaps coupled with notice to the parents of alternatives to be pursued. When the school officials charged with action under the administrative regime fail to carry out their responsibilities, and it transpires
that the diagnosis was incorrect, judicial intervention is necessary precisely because the policies in question were noi followed.48
Moreover, in those rare instances where legislatures have failed to
establish adequate procedures for the vindication of constitutional
rights, courts exercise their highest function by interceding on behalf
of victims. Judicial deference to legislative policy-making has no place
when the legislature has abdicated its responsibilities.4 9
C. Statutory Guaranteesof Education-The Education of the
HandicappedAct
Another possible source of duty, available in a certain subclass of
educational malpractice cases, is the Education of the Handicapped
sometimes supported their refusal to recognize a duty with a statement that such recognition
would place the courts in the position of super school boards. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439
A.2d 582, 584 (Md. 1982).
47. A related problem is whether established administrative remedies should preclude, or at
least delay, access to the judiciary. Because the legislature has charged, say, a school board, with
educational policy decisions, the argument is that the relevant agency should have the chance to
tidy up matters before the court is brought in. As discussed infra part IV, this approach as a
general matter is not incorrect, provided the administrative machinery is at least somewhat
effective. But, as in other areas of law, there appears no reason to bar judicial involvement once
the administrative procedures have been exhausted, or exhaustion would be futile. Mrs. W. v.
Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1987) (defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings
for failure by the plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies under the EHA denied, where
plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that administrative relief would have been inadequate). See also
KENNETH C. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 26:11 (2d ed. 1983).
48. The bellwether case here is Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (App. Div.
1978), rev'd, 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979), in which precisely this sort of prolonged misplacement
resulted from a negligent initial diagnosis. The case is discussed in detail infra part IV.A. The
appellate division, although reversed by New York's Court of Appeals, had the better argument:
"It ill-becomes the Board of Education to argue for the untouchability of its own policy and
procedures when the gist of plaintiff's complaint is that the entity which did not follow them was
the board itself." 410 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
49. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), stands as the best-recognized example of a
case in which the Court unanimously exercised its constitutional function by overriding state
statutes that either permitted or required racial segregation.
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Act (EHA), enacted in 1968 and subsequently amended on several
occasions." The Act was passed to ensure that:
[C]hildren with disabilities have available... a free appropriate public
education which emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of children
with disabilities ... are protected [and] to assist States and localities to
provide for the education of all children with disabilities .... 51
The Act establishes a federal-state partnership, by which federal
funds become available for the fulfillment of the above goals, provided
that the state meets certain eligibility requirements. States must put
into effect a policy and develop a plan to grant handicapped children
the right to a public education. 2 States also are impelled to adopt a
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988 & Supp. 1990). The Act has been amended in 1974, 1975, 1977,
1983, 1986, 1988, and 1990. Several of these amendments have also been awarded names, but
"the Act," as used herein refers to the Education of the Handicapped Act, including all
amendments.
51. Id. § 1400(c) (1988). The Act's passage was inspired by congressional findings that the
educational needs of more than half of the eight million handicapped children in the United
States were not being met, that parents were forced to look beyond the public school systems for
education of their children with disabilities, and that state and local educational agencies had
advanced to the point where federal funding could be effectively used to meet the educational
needs of such children. Id § 1400(b).
A brief and effective treatment of the Act's history can be found in Jo Ann Engelhardt, Note,
The Educationfor All HandicappedChildrenAct: Opening the Schoclhouse Door, 6 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 43, 45-48 (1976). Engelhardt notes that Congress began drafting this
legislation in the wake of two then-recent cases in which federal district courts had required both
Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia to provide an "adequate" education to all students.
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
modifying, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972). The Mills court went one step further, holding that a lack of funds was no excuse for
failing to provide the handicapped with an education. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876.
The question of what is meant by "adequate" is of course difficult to answer, and Congress did
not materially contribute to the solution by requiring states to prcvide an "appropriate public
education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). The Supreme Court attempted to supply some guidance in
Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982):
The Act's requirement of a 'free appropriate public education' consists of educational
instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported
by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction.
Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definitic.n also requires that such
instruction and services be provided at public expense and unde- public supervision, meet
the State's educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular
education, and comport with the child's [individual educational program]. Thus, if
personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the
child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are
satisfied, the child is receiving a 'free appropriate public education' as defined by the Act.
52. This is a vast oversimplification of how the statute actually works. While a more detailed
treatment is beside the point here, a few points should be made. First, although the statute was in
large part designed to provide federal funding to educate the handicapped, even qualifying
programs receive only a portion of their funding from the federal government; the state must
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system of procedural safeguards to ensure that handicapped children
actually receive the services to which the Act entitles them. One of
the most important mechanisms for protecting these statutory rights is
the opportunity for "an impartial due process hearing... conducted
by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency...
53
as determined by State law or by the State educational agency."

How might this statutory scheme serve as the basis for an educational malpractice claim? The first question to ask is whether the child
meets the statutory definition of handicapped. That definition is broad
enough to include many of the children who are likely to claim injury
through educational malpractice, since it includes physical disabilities, 54 speech impairments,55 mental retardation, serious emotional
disturbance, and other "specific learning disabilities." 5 6 All children
so afflicted are protected to the extent that they, by reason of their
handicap, "need special education and related services." 5 7
Once it has been determined that a child meets the statutory definition, redress to the courts will be possible because the statute expressly
creates a private right of action. 58 There are at least two important
come up with the remainder. By the terms of 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(V), federal
funds are limited to the number of handicapped children within a qualifying state, multiplied by
40 percent "of the average per pupil expenditure in public elementary and secondary schools in
the United States .... Further, only 12 percent of all students within a given state may be
classified as handicapped for the purpose of receiving federal funds. Id. § 1411(a)(5)(A).
How does the state's plan qualify for funds under the Act? The state must evaluate students to
determine which are handicapped, and must then develop what is referred to as an individualized
education program to suit that particular student's needs. To the extent possible, handicapped
students are to be educated with normal children. Id. § 1412(5)(B). Sometimes the student may
be able to attend only certain programs with classmates, but in cases of severe handicap, the
student may have to be entirely segregated from other students. Id.
53. Id. § 1415(b)(2). The statute also provides an absolute right of appeal, to either state or
federal district court, for those who disagree with the decision made at the administrative
level(s). In such a case, the court, based on the administrative records and any additional
evidence the parties present, "shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Id.
§§ 1415(e)(l)-(2).
54. Included are children with "hearing impairments .... visual impairments.... orthopedic
impairments, [or] other health impairments." Id. § 1401(a)(1).
55. Also protected are children with "language impairments." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Mountain View-Los Altos Union High Sch. Dist. v. Sharron B.H., 709 F.2d 28,
29 (9th Cir. 1983) (because the statute, by terms, permits the filing of a civil action, "[tihere is no
doubt... that [it] grants a private right of action"). The more interesting question, discussed
infra note 62, is whether money damages can be recovered for violation of the statute. However
this question is resolved, the damage awarded is only for the cost of education; it does not
substitute for the tort damage remedy, with its goal of making plaintiff whole. In White v. State,
240 Cal. Rptr. 732, 742 (Ct. App. 1987), for example, the court held that such tort damages were
not recoverable.
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qualifications, however. First, plaintiffs are generally required to defer
judicial redress until after the administrative proceedings, including
the hearing mentioned above. Second, despite the statutory language
granting the court authority to "grant such relief as [it] determines is
appropriate, '59 courts have not been sympathetic to claims for damages. Some courts have declared damages inappropriate ° while
others have limited damage actions to situations involving bad faith or
intentional misconduct. 6 1 The Supreme Court has made clear that
reimbursement is to be granted for the cost of alternative education
of the child, but has
made necessary by the state's improper placement
62
question.
damages
the
answered
not otherwise
Thus, the statute at once creates and tightly restricts the duty. Inasmuch as traditional negligence theories have proven unavailing, any
prospect of relief will presumably be cheered by victims of educational
malpractice. But are the results defensible? As is later contended, the
prevailing judicial interpretations of these statutes have usually been
sensible, under a view that pays proper attention to policy makers'
representations and communications, and to the range of options
available to handicapped students and their parents. To the extent
that broad recovery for damages has been foreclosed, however, the
decisions are sometimes deficient.
D. Express Representationsand Fraud
Despite the obvious limitations inherent in disallowing damage
claims in the greatest number of cases, the EHA has provided at least
some recourse to a certain class of educational malpractice plaintiffs.
Another theoretically promising, but also limited, area of recovery has
been recognized where courts have found express representations that
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).
60. See, e.g., Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979); Johnson v. Clark, 418
N.W.2d 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
61. See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1209-14 (7th Cir. 1981) (limiting
damages to cases in which a placement was made that either endangered the child's physical
health or evinced a bad-faith failure to comply with the procedural provisions of the EHA).
62. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Maryland Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 371 (1985). One
question left open by Burlington was whether parents who could not afford the cost of alternative
education could later receive, at the state's expense, compensatory educational services. Courts
so far have held that such was proper. See White v. State, 240 Cal. Rptr. 732, 741 (Ct. App.
1987) ("We cannot believe EHA-eligible children may obtain relief only if their parents have the
financial resources to pay initially for services wrongfully denied ander the EHA."); see also
Miener ax rel. Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 1986). It may be required,
however, that the institution into which the parents place the child be on the list of cost-andprogram-approved schools; in other words, the list from which placement ab initio would have
App. Ct. 1986).
been proper. Taglianetti ex rel Taglianetti v. Cronin, 493 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill.
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were not delivered upon. And, in something of a "flip side" to the
class of affirmative, express representations, some courts have not been
opposed to claims for intentional misrepresentation.
Unfortunately for proponents of judicial recognition of educational
malpractice, the greatest number of successful claims have arisen in
the private educational context, where courts are in less fear of trampling upon state prerogative. Further, the success of such claims has
been limited by the very theories that germinate them. In short, the
cases provide scant encouragement for those seeking extensive damages for pervasive educational malpractice.
Cases such as Village Community School v. Adler 63 support these
observations. There, the mother of a student found herself defending
against an action by a private school to recover tuition payments. She
set up counterclaims for breach of contract, both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In support, she alleged that the school fraudulently or negligently represented that its faculty could identify and treat children with learning
disabilities, and that she had relied on these representations to her detriment." She further alleged that the school's subsequent failure to
provide such services amounted to a breach of contract, and that the
same failure led to emotional distress.6 5
The court in Adler allowed the breach of contract counterclaim to.
survive the motion to dismiss.66 The court invoked the familiar spectre of judicial oversight of the educational mission, but noted that such
concerns were not present in this case: "When [the school] promised
to detect learning disabilities, [it] effectively . . .made [detection] a
requirement for full contract performance. In deciding whether to
allow this action, this court is not required to review any discretionary
actions taken as a result of plaintiff's professional judgment."6 7 Also
permitted to survive was the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.
The court once again carefully picked through the allegations before
63. 478 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Civ. Ct. 1984).

64. Id. at 547.
65. Perhaps because the court decided not to allow the counterclaim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress to proceed, it was somewhat less than clear in describing the precise nature of
the distress. It said only this: "[The complaint] alleges that psychiatric intervention was
necessary because her son received services which proved to be inappropriate and harmful when
plaintiff failed to diagnose or misdiagnosed his learning disability." Id.
66. The court's willingness to entertain this claim can be traced to Paladino v. Adelphi Univ.,
454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982). See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
67. Alder, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
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it, noting that the representations here were solid, and therefore reasonably relied on.68
The court made clear, however, that there would be no recovery
beyond the tuition and ill-defined "consequential" damages. It is
unclear whether those consequential damages would include the emotional damage that might have resulted from the school's failure to
provide the services. On the one hand, the court was unequivocal in
rejecting the separate emotional distress claim on the authority of earlier New York cases that had been based on claims of negligence.6 9 If
there is no underlying cognizable negligent act, there can be no recovery for emotional distress resulting therefrom.7 ° On the other hand,
the court did not address the question of whether such damages, or for
that matter punitive damages, might be recoverable if the counterclaim for fraud were to succeed.
Similarly, in Wickstrom v. North Idaho College,7 1 the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized that the breach of a sufficiently express
promise was actionable. The college, a state institution,72 published a
bulletin in which it stated that graduates of a "Maintenance Mechanic
(Millwright)" course would be qualified for employment as "entry
level journeymen." Plaintiffs, students who had been enrolled in the
course, had not mentioned in their complaint "how the course might
have failed to comply with the terms of the contract as found in the
school bulletin."7 Nonetheless, they were permitted to amend their
complaint to specify the ways in which the course had failed. The
court thus recognized, at least in principle, that claims for breach of
express promises were actionable.74
68. For reasons not fully explained, but based on the court's reading of Donohue and
Hoffman, the claim for negligent misrepresentation was rejected. Se? infra part IV. The court
had once again to deal with Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982).
Although Paladinorejected the intentional misrepresentation claims, it did so because the facts
"fail[ed] to bear out the claim that the school made false representations to the parents." Id. at
875. The Paladinocourt's refusal to reject this class of claims out of hand created a wedge that
the Adler court then drove into the previously solid wall against educational malpractice claims.
69. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979); Dcnohue v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
70. Adler, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 548-49.
71. 725 P.2d 155 (Idaho 1986).
72. The court noted that the relationship between students and their colleges was contractual,
regardless of whether the school was private or public. Id. at 157 (quoting Peretti v. Montana,
464 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979), rev'd on othergrounds, 661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1981)). Of
course, it is much less clear whether students at the high school or elementary school level stand
in the same relation of contract to their institutions.
73. Id. at 158.
74. The court, however, was not sympathetic to the companion tort claim. Plaintiffs had
failed to comply with the notice provision applicable to claims against state entities, so the
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The court did not telegraph its view as to damages, which were
claimed for "lost wages, fringe benefits and anticipated increased earnings, general and punitive damages and attorney fees and costs."" It
appears likely that, given the contractual basis of the surviving claim,
punitive damages would not be recoverable, while all of the others
might properly be considered consequential.76 But the damage claim
in this case is far different from that raised in the vast majority of
educational malpractice claims, for here the damages are more easily
limited as to time and source. One need only reflect on a case alleging
functional illiteracy, or negligent misdiagnosis of a young child, to discern the difference. Further, there is no claim here for emotional distress." In short, recognition of claims for breach of contract or for
intentional misrepresentation has not thus far assisted a significant
number of educational malpractice "victims," nor is that result surprising. As to express representation, courts unwilling to interfere in
the setting or implementation of educational policy can hardly be
dismissal of the tort action was unexceptionable. However, the court took the time to rejectwithout citation to authority and in a footnote-the possibility of general claims for educational
malpractice. Id. at 157 n.l.
A similar approach was in evidence in the recent Ohio case of Malone v. Academy of Court
Reporting, Nos. 90AP-264, 90AP-430, 1990 WL 250496 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1990), where
plaintiffs had been enrolled in a paralegal training course that, they alleged, failed to deliver upon
the promised program in almost every possible respect. Upending the lower court's dismissal of
the complaint, the court of appeals held that plaintiffs had stated a claim for misrepresentation
and for breach of contract. Id. at *4. The court was impressed by the definiteness of the
promises made, and noted that permitting plaintiffs to proceed would in no way disturb
legislative prerogatives in regulating and accrediting private schools. Id. at *2-3. But, the court
also noted that plaintiffs had not alleged educational malpractice as a basis for their complaint,
and suggested that it would follow other courts in disallowing such a claim. 7d. at *3.
75. Wickstrom, 725 P.2d at 156.
76. But recovery of consequential damages under contract law may leave plaintiff short of the
full recovery theoretically provided under tort law. In Idaho, as elsewhere, consequential
damages for breach of contract are not recoverable "unless they were contemplated by the parties
at the time of contracting." Strate v. Cambridge Tel. Co., 795 P.2d 319, 322 (Idaho Ct. App.
1990) (citing Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co., 764 P.2d 423 (Idaho 1988)).
General foreseeability will suffice. Id. (citing Suitts v. First Sec. Bank, 713 P.2d 1374 (Idaho
1985)). Section 351 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reflects the same view.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 351 (1981).

The Restatement also recognizes that courts may limit recovery of damages to avoid
"disproportionate compensation." Id. § 351(3); see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-15 (3d ed. 1987). In contrast, tort liability is bounded
only by the requirements of legal causation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 917 cmt. d
(1981).
77. For a third case involving this principle of contract damages for failure to deliver a
package of educational promises, see Zumbrum v. University of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct.
App. 1972), in which it was alleged that a partial refund of tuition was owed a student who was
simply not taught the final month of her sociology course. Again, though, it is important to keep
in mind that plaintiff was seeking only a tuition refund, not more general damages.
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expected to interpret anything short of private, consensual agreements
(supported by consideration) as creating an enforceable promise. Judicial sympathy for the victims of fraud has been cabined by the twin
difficulties of proving that the representation was intentional and sufficiently definite to inspire reasonable reliance.78
III.

REPRESENTATION IN TORT

Why have courts gone to heroic lengths to avoid finding a duty to
provide an adequate education, or to limit strictly any duty they are
constrained to recognize? As mentioned in the introduction, this
chilly reception to educational malpractice claims stems from fear that
such actions, once unleashed, will lead to fertile and unruly litigation.
Courts are also concerned with arrogating to the judiciary the prerogatives of the legislature. The representational model now introduced
should quell those fears that are legitimate, and can also speak to the
question of how best to balance the legislative and judicial functions in
the educational setting. In education, as elsewhere in law, representations lie on a spectrum between the express and definite, on the one
end, and the implied and subtle, on the other. Accordingly, the same
considerations called into play in other areas of tort can be productively applied to those cases that happen to allege "educational malpractice." Thus, examining courts' use of representation in other
areas of tort will illuminate the judicial mistreatment of educational
malpractice.
The present section has two related aims. First, by way ofjustifying
the focus on representation in the educational setting, the representational dimension of other areas of tort is considered. The force and
impact of representation, both implied and express, pervades tort law
and can provide a solid structuring principle for a great number of
cases.7 9 Medical malpractice and product liability cases have been
chosen as the vehicles for making this point. Drawing these somewhat
78. See KEETON et al., supra note 12, § 107, at 741-45 (intent to deceive), § 109, at 755-58.
79. I pause here to note my debt to the work of Professor Shapo, who in 1974 convincingly
applied this representational perspective to product liability law. Marshall S. Shapo, A
Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for
ProductDisappointment,60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974). His caveat in that context bears repeating
here:
I ... offer the representational analysis as an especially useful medium for attack on these
problems, but I shall not claim for it the properties of a universal solvent. The issues
involved are too complex, too tied with unknown aspects of behavior, and too linked to
fierce arguments about the nature of our political economy for a single legal analysis to
provide a panacea.
Id. at 1116 (footnote omitted).
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disparate areas of liability into relief highlights the signal importance
of representation throughout the law of tort, and suggests that a similar focus in the educational malpractice cases calls many of the decisions into question. To supply a context for the discussion of
representation in education cases, this section begins with these two
established areas.
This section then moves to an analysis of the representations (less
formally, the communications) made by school officials to students
and parents. Inasmuch as this project requires analysis of the allocation of responsibility between school and parent, it undertakes a brief
examination of the jurisprudence on that issue. A discussion of the
reasonableness of reliance on such representations, however, is
deferred until part IV, where the issue can be addressed in the context
of specific cases.
A.

Representation in Medical Malpractice Cases

Although the source of the duty owed by physicians to their
patients is not typically cast in representational terms, it has long been
clear that professionals and skilled tradespeople alike are accountable
for failure to perform in accordance with the skills that define their
jobs. Otherwise stated, one who holds himself out as a doctor, lawyer,
or for that matter, a linoleum-tile installer8" impliedly contracts that
he will perform to the skill level required by the nature of the profession or occupation.8 1
Of course, the same rationale that supports the notion of an implied
representation suggests its limitations. Because reliance on a misrepresentation must be reasonable, recovery may be precluded where plaintiff is on notice that defendant, despite membership in a skilled
profession or trade, in fact lacks or is unable to exercise those skills.8 2
80. Garcia v. Color Tile Distrib. Co., 408 P.2d 145, 148 (N.M. 1965) ("tHaving undertaken
to render services in the practice of a skilled trade, [defendant] impliedly warranted that it would
exercise such reasonable degree of skill as the nature of the services required.").
81. See Elson, supra note 6, at 706-07 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 165
(1850)); see also Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985) ("[E]ach physician has a nondelegable duty to render professional services consistent with that objectively ascertained
minimally acceptable level of competence he may be expected to apply given the qualifications
and level of expertise he holds himself out as possessing and given the circumstances of the
particular case.") (emphasis added).
82. A dramatic illustration of this principle is supplied by the ancient case of McKleroy v.
Sewell, 73 Ga. 657 (1884). There, plaintiff continued to employ a family physician for years after
discovering that the physician was an alcoholic. When the patient refused to pay the bill, the
doctor sued to compel payment, and prevailed. In affirming the verdict for the physician, the
Georgia Supreme Court sustained the following jury instruction: "'If a man sends for a doctor,
and the doctor treats the patient while he (the doctor) is intoxicated, and the patient afterwards
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In almost every case, however, there is a minimal standard to which
physicians must rise, or face liability. This standard accounts both for
the representations that take place in the medical treatment context
and for the patient's situation and protection-concerns that are also
present in the educational setting.
Hall v. Hilbun8 3 provides a good discussion of the elements that
create the standard. First, the court assumed that all physicians
understand the basic "laws of medicine [that] do not vary from state to
state .... ,,4 Further, physicians must be presumed to know (or have
a way of finding out) at least as much as "minimally competent physicians in the same ... field of practice," and must also exercise a reasonable level of skill and care in carrying out their tasks.8 5 In deciding
whether the doctors discharged their responsibilities to their patients,
however, the circumstances under which the medical care is rendered
may be considered by the jury. 6
In its holding, the Hall court gave legal effect to a number of truths
about the current practice of medicine. National standardization 8of7
training, coupled with increased access to the latest technology,
makes fair the imposition of a national standard of care. At the same
time, it would be a mistake to suppose that all physicians labor under
the same conditions. The local, rural doctor, for example, often has
neither the training nor the facilities to duplicate the quality of care
delivered by physicians in large, well-funded hospitals. Patients'
expectations should vary accordingly.
calls in said doctor and continues to employ him, it would be a waiver of all objection to the
doctor on account of his habit of intoxication.'" Id at 658. Could the doctor assert the
plaintiff's contributory negligence or assumption of risk as a defense if the action were for
malpractice? McKleroy was decided in the era of contributory negligence, in which any fault by
plaintiff precluded recovery. The more fluid apportionment of liability that now prevails would
dictate a more just result by reducing, but not precluding, plaintiff's recovery, unless a court
were to decide that reasons of policy required the doctor to bear full responsibility in such a case.
83. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
84. Id. at 870.
85. Id. at 871.
86. The court summarized the rule it established:
[G]iven the circumstances of each patient, each physician has a duty to use his or her
knowledge and therewith treat through maximum reasonable medical recovery, each
patient, with such reasonable diligence, skill, competence, and prudence as are practiced by
minimally competent physicians in the same specialty or general field of practice throughout
the United States, who have available to them the same general facilities, equipment and
options.
Id. at 873.
87. For a good practical discussion of the various computer databases available to today's
doctors, see BARRY R. FURROW et al., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATEF:IALS AND PROBLEMS 133
(2d ed. 1991).
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The Hall court thus followed the trend of abrogating the now- discredited locality rule 8 -under which the physician was held only to
the standard of doctors practicing within the local area-while
allowing consideration of the available medical resources as one factor
in determining whether sound medical practice has been followed.8 9
Presumably, this provides the needed flexibility for taking into account
whether, in a particular case, the patient could reasonably have
expected better treatment than received.
By casting the issue in terms of "medical resources," the court provides a surer link between representation and reliance. A patient is
more justified in relying on the evidence before him or her-including
hospital facilities and cost-than on location qua location. But due
consideration to the availability of resources is to remain separate
from the physician's knowledge and care, which should not be permitted to slip below a threshold of competence.
One of the objections to recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice is that pedagogy, unlike medicine, admits of no
such standards: Good teaching is too much a matter of discretion (or
"feel") to subject teachers to liability. This argument, however,
should not be taken seriously. While it is true that basic medical
knowledge is more objective than pedagogy, there is something akin to
a standard of good teaching, at least regarding certain core mattersY°
If psychologists are held liable for negligent diagnosis and treatment,

88. The court reversed the trial court's grant of a directed verdict for defendant, which had
been granted because the testimony of plaintiff's expert was excluded. Since the exclusion was
based on the aspect of the locality rule that restricted expert testimony to local physicians, the
appellate court's abrogation of the locality rule eliminated the justification for excluding the
testimony. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 860.
89. Under the locality rule, the defendant doctor is required to exercise "the average degree of
skill exercised by [doctors] in [the same] locality or in a similar locality." Weinstock v. Ott, 444
N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). The rule has been justified by the related perceptions
that the local, rural doctor, for example, has neither the training, the knowledge, nor the
resources to deliver the same level of medical care as better-positioned colleagues. In Brune v.
Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1968), the court found that the rule was sensible
at the time it was established, but noted that it was "unsuited to present day conditions," at least
in part because of the greater exchanges of information between doctors that now occur.
If the court's observations are accurate, abrogation of the locality rule makes sense. Because
the "common knowledge" of patients presumably keeps pace with information-sharing by
physicians, the representations that can be implied from the doctor-patient relationship should
expand correspondingly.
90. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 795 n.55. Professor Ratner approvingly cites studies
identifying characteristics of successful teachers, but believes that the issue in the educational
malpractice setting should be whether the school is doing its job of educating students.
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why not teachers?9 1 Further, only a small percentage of cases cast as
"educational malpractice" would even theoretically involve secondguessing pedagogical decisions; many involve the very same types of
acts (or omissions) as one sees in the medical malpractice context. If a
child is misdiagnosed as suffering from a certain learning disability,
justified reliance on that diagnosis moves the student into the same
position of relative helplessness as one injured by an act of medical
malpractice. As will be demonstrated, however, some educational
malpractice claims (particularly those alleging functional illiteracy)
should fail precisely because the student (and his or her parents) are
not justified in relying on the school system, nor are they helpless.
B. Representationsin ProductLiability
In its original incarnation, the principle of strict liability in tort for
defective products was justified, at least in part, by a theory of implied
representation. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,9 2 Justice Traynor's memorable concurrence repeatedly emphasized the plaintiffs'
inability to inspect products for defects and their forced reliance "on
the reputation of the manufacturer."9 3 But, in holding that the manufacturer could only be held to represent the safety of the product as it
left the factory (before subsequent alterations and plaintiff misuse),
Traynor was also indicating that the reliance must be reasonable.
Justice Traynor's theme sounded again in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,94 where his preference for strict liability finally prevailed. The language he chose in permitting the plaintiff to plead a
strict liability claim is instructive: "Implicit in the machine's presence
on the market.., was a representation that it would safely do the jobs
for which it was built."9 5 This principle requires that the representation, and not something else, led to plaintiff's injury. Thus, plaintiff
must prove that he was injured while using the product "in a way it
was intended to be used as a result of a defect... of which plaintiffwas
not aware."96
The relation between representation, reliance, and causation in a
defective product case can thus be captured as follows. The manufac91. The better reason for not holding teachers, or their employing school districts, liable for
problems like functional illiteracy has to do with the vast differences between the types of injuries
that physicians typically cause, as opposed to those caused by educators. See infra part IV.
92. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
93. Id. at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
94. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
95. Id. at 901.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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turer places its product on the market. Although no express representation is made, the consumer, in no position to inspect for hidden
defects, is compelled to rely upon the safety of the product. If injury
then results from such a defect, a closed circuit leading to recovery is
established. 97
Variations on this paradigm abound. For instance, the notion of a
forced, implied representation works best in the manufacturing defect
cases, involving a "glitch" in a particular product that causes injury.
There, of course, plaintiff's helplessness and attendant forced reliance
are well-nigh abject; if the defendant is unable to detect the defect, a

fortiori so is the plaintiff. Liability is therefore strict.
Design defect cases raise more complicated issues, and the liability
rules that deal with these cases are, in the main, responsive to the differences between manufacturing and design defects. In a design defect
case, the injured party is attempting to pin liability upon a seller for
making a conscious decision to manufacture a product in a certain
way, when a safer alternative exists. 98 If liability were strict, liability
would be imposed in every case of injury, apart from those caused by
plaintiff or third parties.
As Professor Shapo has pointed out, judicial rejection of this inflexible approach reflects the common sense perception that consumers of
products are well aware that the products they buy and use cannot be
rendered risk-free. 99 The background is thus one colored by choice, in
which "it is desirable to allow citizens to choose various combinations
97. Of course, one of the most difficult problems is proving that the product did in fact cause
the injury:
[I]t should not be supposed that plaintiffs have had an easy time in products liability cases
.... The plaintiff must painfully trace his way from the original defect to his ultimate
harm through the use and possible abuse of the product either by himself or third parties, all
without running afoul of the limitations on remoteness of damage.
RICHARD A. EPsTEIN et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 638 (4th ed. 1984).
98. Thus, if defendant's product is manufactured to the "state of the art," a good defense to
liability has been made out. For purposes of this discussion, I ignore the few (and often critized)
cases that have refused to recognize the "state of the art" defense to a claim of defective design.
If such defense is not recognized, of course, liability is strict. The best known of these cases, that
effectively impose strict liability for an injury-causing product, is Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). Beshada has itself been "restrict[ed] . . . to the
circumstances giving rise to its holding." Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J.
1984). Feldman subsequently was retried, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff. On cross-appeals,
the New Jersey Superior Court reversed that decision, holding that the breach of duty to warn
that supported the jury's verdict was unacceptable, because it was pre-empted by federal law.
Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 561 A.2d 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). The New Jersey
Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case to the appelate court for consideration of the
remaining issues on appeal. Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 592 A.2d 1176 (N.J. 1991).
99. Shapo, supra note 79, at 1260-61.
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' ° Thus arises the
of utility and risk. '""
balancing required by negligence law.
In practical terms, this need to balance means that cases will be
more difficult to resolve. One might wonder whether the product user
truly chose a cluster of risks given the product's utility, or whether the
swirl of implied representations, some of them subtle, masked or distorted certain information. Jural doubts on this issue can be resolved
for defendant where plaintiff proceeded in the teeth of express warnings against the product use that caused injury. 10 ' Most cases are not
so simply resolved, however, because it will not be so clear that the
warning covered the conduct at issue, or because the injured person
may not have received the warning, or may not have understood it, or
may have been unable to act upon it. 10 2 Courts are well-advised,
Shapo concludes, to consider all representations, and the reliancesometimes forced-of product users on sellers. As I argue in part IV,
these same considerations can be applied profitably to the educational
context.
As one illustration of the difficult problems presented by representation and reasonable reliance in the products context, consider the socalled patent danger cases. Courts have struggled for years with the
question of what to do where the defect and potential for injury are
patent, but plaintiff nonetheless uses the product so as to encounter an
obvious risk. On a basic level, such misuse may be said to defeat reliance on the manufacturer's representation and so to snap the causal
chain running from manufacturer to injury. Courts originally so
10 3
held.
100. Id. at 1115.
101. This presumes that the warnings are sufficiently clear to put the consumer on notice of
the danger. Where this is so, recovery has been denied for a variety of reasons: the consumer's
use breaks the chain of causation between the manufacturer's creation of the defect and the
injury; the consumer has access to all necessary information; and the consumer is, in economic
terms, the cheapest cost-avoider. Id. at 1226-28, 1296-1301. As we shall see, even if the defect
is patent, or the warning clear, other justifications for imposing liability may still sway courts.
102. Id. at 1302-17. Shapo somewhat fuses these issues, which courts have been careful to
keep separate. He focuses instead on data concerning consumer behavior, focusing on
perceptions, intelligence, and investigation.
103. In Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 34 N.W.2d 853 (Wis. 1948), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that liability might be based on failure to include a safety
feature that might have prevented fingers from becoming trapped in a hay baler's rollers. The
court thought the danger obvious to a person of "ordinary intelligence," and denied recovery for
fear that "if [plaintiff's] contention were sound, every meat grinder or other machine capable of
mangling fingers would be an instrument the safe use of which would be guaranteed by the
manufacturer." Id. at 858; see also Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950), overruledby
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976). Campo's overruling is the best known
instance of the denigration of the patent danger rule. Critics of the demise of the patent danger
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More recently, however, products liability doctrine has imported
the narrowing of assumption of risk that has proceeded apace in negligence. The result is that plaintiffs often are able to reach the jury on
the issue of the reasonableness of their conduct in encountering a
known risk."° Many of these cases can be justified by a generous
interpretation of reasonable reliance. 105 For example, where the user
of the product is an employee, he or she may rely on a chain of safety
106
running from the manufacturer to the employer.
Constriction of the patent danger rule does not mean that plaintiffs
are entitled in all cases to recover where they proceed in the face of
danger. 10 7 In short, judicial struggles in this area are but another
rule have echoed the same concern expressed by the court in Yaun; Professor Epstein, for
instance, asks the following rhetorical questions: "Can any case be made out [in support of the
patent danger rule]? Is the.., rule sound if the function of the law is to provide the user of the
product with information necessary to decide whether, and if so how, to use the product?"
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 719 (5th ed. 1990).
104. Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1981), provides a striking
illustration of the withering of assumption of risk in the product liability context. Plaintiff,
injured by an explosion of propane gas, had disregarded a warning on the door of his camper to
the effect that natural gas should not be connected to the gas piping system. He also thought
inapplicable the instruction to test the gas line before using the system, and failed to inspect for
gas leaks, although he was generally aware of the danger of propane gas. Applying West
Virginia law, the court agreed with plaintiff that "there was insufficient evidence to instruct the
jury on assumption of risk." Id. at 73. According to the court: "Harris knew of the explosive
properties of propane gas and of the general dangers of gas leaks[, but] Karri-On did not
demonstrate that Harris actually knew that the gas piping system was defective or that there was
a gas leak." Id. at 74. As to the disregarded warnings, the court stated that: "While disregard of
warnings may be a part of assumption of risk, there must still be evidence that the victim
subjectively knew of the defect and its dangers." Id But see Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261
N.E.2d 305 (Ill. 1970) (remanding for factual findings on whether plaintiff had subjectively
appreciated the risk of injury from using a trencher without heeding the cautionary instructions).
105. Put differently, courts have become more generous to plaintiffs in construing the
assumption of risk defense. In Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972),
for example, plaintiff was permitted to "rely" on his car steering mechanism, even though he had
experienced problems with it for a period of time and had actually had difficulty keeping the car
on the road. In affirming the judgment for plaintiff over defendant manufacturer's objection that
the conduct amounted to assumption of risk, the court effectively said that reasonableness of
reliance must be assessed in light of all relevant facts, including plaintiff's unquestioned need to
use the car extensively in his job.
106. It is perhaps more accurate to say that courts recognize that employees who may be
aware of a product's hazard face a Hobson's choice: proceed in the face of danger, or run the risk
that the employer will find someone else who will. A consideration of whether, and to what
extent, this dilemma survives the enactment of modern worker protection legislation is beyond
the scope of this Article.
107. Indeed, despite a sharp disagreement on whether to allow comparative negligence
principles to take root in the product liability context, Justice Mosk of the California Supreme
Court suggested in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978), that recovery
would be improper in cases of misconduct so extreme that reasonable reliance could not possibly
be made out, such as using a power saw to trim one's fingernails. Id. at 1185 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Judge Mosk's willingness to disallow recovery in such extreme cases of misuse
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application of the principle that reasonableness, here of reliance, is a
jury question unless the court determines that reasonable people could
not agree.
The central position of representation and reliance in the law of
products liability is also emphasized by persistent judicial and legislative uneasiness with holding liable those "middlemen" sellers who are
but conduits between the manufacturer and the consumer. A recent
spate of statutes reflects the relatively disfavored status of strict liability suits against non- manufacturing sellers by requiring some showing
of fault on their part before liability will be imposed. 10 8 Again, this
agonizing is understandable when the following question is put: Do
purchasers of goods reasonably rely on the retailer as representing the
goods to be free of defects? Although the answer to this question is

not obvious, the intuition here is that consumers do not so rely on
retailers at least in the case of sealed containers that retailers cannot

inspect. Accordingly, holding retailers liable may conflict with the
representational model, and must be justified, if at all, in some other

way. 109
Of course, the analogy from product liability to educational malpractice is not complete. One stark difference is choice. Whereas the
would be endorsed by the majority, afortiori, inasmuch as Justice Mosk was willing to overlook
the plaintiff's negligence in using a product, while the majority held that recovery should be
reduced under comparitive principles.
108. Most of these statutes let the non-manufacturing supplier off the hook unless the
manufacturer cannot be reached, usually because of insolvency. See, eg., CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-402 (West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
2-621 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.18 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3306 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Baldwin 1991); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-311 (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.762 (Vernon 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99 B-2 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1 to 06.1
(Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29- 28-106 (Supp. 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040 (West Supp. 1991).
A few jurisdictions take the principle of supplier exculpation more seriously: Even where the
manufacturer cannot be reached, the supplier will not be liable absent some showing of
independent fault. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (Michie Supp. 1991); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 25-21,181 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-9 (1987).
109. The most famous exposition of the justifications for imposing strict liability on sellers of
defective products appears in Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). In brief: (1) mass
sellers of consumer goods are well-positioned to absorb the cost of injuries those goods create by
passing on those costs to consumers; (2) imposing strict liability on sellers increases the incentive
to manufacture safer products; (3) requiring plaintiff to show negligence in causing the defect
imposes an intolerably high evidentiary burden; and (4) plaintiffs are typically incapable of
protecting themselves against defective products, and should not go uncompensated when injury
they could not have prevented occurs. Id at 440-43. Of the above rationales, the first and
fourth appear the most applicable to non-manufacturingsellers of defective goods. The final
justification also incorporates the element of forced reliance.
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purchaser of a product is confronted with a host of decisions including
price, quality, safety, and even appearance, the "consumer" of educational "services" may have little or no choice. Unless the student's
parents have enough income to select from among private and public
schools, the element of choice, at least in the broad sense, is likely
missing.
This very difference in the availability of choice again highlights the
importance of emphasizing the related notions of representation and
reliance. In the product liability context, the consumers' ability to
choose may preclude them from later arguing that the product was
defective. If, for example, a choice was available between a more
expensive machine expressly designed for use on slopes, and a less
expensive one suitable only for level surfaces, if the cheaper one is
chosen and used on a slope, the manufacturer can argue that the
cheaper machine was not represented as suitable (read "safe") for the
use to which it was applied. 1 '
But there is an inverse relation between reliance and choice. Thus,
where, as in the educational context, the choices are more limited (perhaps absent altogether), the forced reliance of the plaintiff on the
defendants' course of action becomes greater. This difference suggests
that plaintiffs should be in a better position in the educational context.
However, the differences between the types of injuries, and how they
are incurred, moves back toward center the fulcrum between actions
for defective products and actions for errors in the educational process. Defective products typically cause sudden, traumatic injury,
against which it is difficult to guard once the product has been
selected. Educational injuries, especially functional illiteracy, typically occur over a period of time, and can therefore be arrested in the
larval stage. So the reduced availability of real choice should be counterbalanced by the plaintiffs' increased ability to defend themselves
against the type of injury constituting most educational malpractice
claims.III
110. Such an argument was made by defendant manufacturer in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 448 (Cal. 1978), and the jury responded by returing a verdict for the defendant.
But the California Supreme Court reversed that judgment because the jury had not been properly
instructed in the law of design defect.
I 11. These observations also help to explain why courts have consistently permitted suits for
negligent supervision that lead to physical injuries arising in the school setting. There, the
choices available to the student asked to perform an experiment or a gymnastics maneuver might
be few and, to make matters worse, the types of traumatic personal injuries that can result are
just like the injuries caused by defective products. A discussion of this class of cases is present
toward the end of part IV.B., infra.
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It is against this backdrop that I introduce the representational theory of educational malpractice. Honesty compels the concession that
the following remarks bespeak "focus" more than "theory." I hope to
persuade the reader, and the courts, that due attention to the representations made in the educational context argues against categorizing
claims as educational malpractice for the purpose of denying them.
C. The Role of Representation in Education
It is useful to direct this discussion by reviewing the general classes
of situations that give rise to educational malpractice claims. First,
there are claims that a student has been graduated from high school
without the basic tools of literacy. Among a host of sources of this
problem are negligent teaching, poor administration, unwarranted
promotion, or failure to take appropriate steps to respond to a particular student's learning needs. Second, there are cases alleging negligent
misdiagnosis resulting in injury. These two categories overlap. For
example, if the effects of one or more misdiagnoses are not quickly
1 12
arrested, functional illiteracy may result.
Either of these unfortunate results grows from a continuous series of
communications. A student's early learning problems may be (and
should be) communicated to the parents by the child's teacher. Sometimes the problems can be solved easily, such as when a correctable
physical deficiency, such as nearsightedness, is diagnosed, or a hyperactive child simply outgrows the condition.
If the problem is not so simply solved, further actions may seem
wise. If the child appears unable to comprehend basic instruction,
other parties-the school psychologist, medical doctors, the principal,
even the board of education-may become involved in the communications that typically occur between teacher, parent, and student.
In the situation depicted above, the parent is properly armed with
the information needed for action, and can assist the school and the
child in solving, or at least working with, the problem that makes
learning difficult. Whether the problem is physical, emotional, mental,
or some combination, matters less than the ability to diagnose and to
respond.
If the diagnose-and-respond model were consistently followed, there
would be few educational malpractice suits, and probably none involving generic claims of functional illiteracy. Parents should be charged
with the unhappy knowledge that the school system is not always successful in turning out literate graduates capable of assuming their posi112. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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tions in society. This knowledge, coupled with proper concern for
their child's welfare, both provides the needed incentive for parents to
assume an active, participatory role in the educational process, and
belies a general argument that the parents "reasonably relied" on the
school system, or its teachers, to guarantee their child's progress.
There are, however, several important problems that may cloud this
portrayal.
First, the actual communicative process is in fact much noisier than
depicted above. Large class size may retard, or even prevent, diagnosis of problems. Teacher recommendations for action may be ignored
or misunderstood11 3 by higher-ups within the school system, or victimized by lack of resources. Parents may not be timely notified of
problems. Parental apathy or misunderstanding may also stand in the
way of corrective action. These kinds of problems lead to illiteracy,
and, in turn, to actions for educational malpractice. In assessing the
validity of a such claims, courts should explore what may have gone
wrong in the communications by and between all involved in the educational mission. Conducting such an inquiry will not place the judiciary in the position of second-guessing those in charge of establishing
educational policy. The focus should rather be whether there has been
a slip between the chosen policy and its implementation, and, if so, on
1 14
the source of that slip.
The second problem is closely related to the first, and arises where
the educational entity lacks, or has only rusty, mechanisms for combatting problems. The ability to diagnose a problem loses significance
if no further action can be taken. In such a case, parents are placed in
a position of forced reliance-not unlike that of victims of defective
113. A striking example of the failure of school officials to heed the diagnostic warning of one
of its employees is found in Hoffman v. Board of Education, 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979), where
the school district allegedly ignored a recommendation by the school's pyschologist to reevaluate
the child within two years. Perhaps as a result, the child, who turned out to possess normal
intelligence, remained in a classroom for retarded children for more than ten years.
114. See, eg., Collingsworth, supra note 6, at 492-94, where the suggestion is made that true
policy choices may be protected by immunity, even where traditional governmental immunity
has been removed, but that the implementation of the chosen policy should be subject to judicial
scrutiny: "Decisions that would probably be immune include such things as curriculum choice,
range of special programs, and what educational theory to implement .... But if due to
negligent test administration, a child is mistakenly placed in [a] special class and suffers harm,
this action would not be immune." Id. at 494.
Not all commentators are so ready to insulate decisions on basic policy from judicial review.
Professor Ratner, for example, having first identified common characteristics present in
"successful schools," then proceeds to call for policies designed to achieve those characteristics.
See Ratner, supra note 6, at 800, 809.
As noted supra part II.B., judicial second-guessing of legislative policy determinations is
required where constitutional rights would otherwise be compromised.
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products or of a negligently performed operation-and should be permitted judicial recourse. 1 5 In an appropriate case, a court might
the usual requirement of
even properly excuse the injured party 1from
6
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
I do not mean to suggest that recourse to the courts is the preferred
response. Rather, a rational, multi-step process of handling such
problems (whatever their source) should be encouraged. At the first
level, informal assessment and attendant communication to parents
resolves many problems. At subsequent, increasingly more formal
levels, all concerned parties should work towards arresting the development of potentially serious injury while forging a solution acceptable to all involved. As a healthy by-product of such a process, parents,
teachers and administrators have a forum in which different views
may be percolated-in service of the communication that is central to
a wel-run educational system.
D.

The Role and Responsibility of Parents in Education

Until now, clarity of exposition has dictated deferral of one of the
stickiest problems of all-deciding how best to allocate responsibility
for education between the state and the parent. No easy answer suggests itself. Historically, the responsibility for educating children
rested with the parent.1 7 It was not until the nineteenth century that
states began to enact compulsory education laws. Indeed, free public
115. Some of the cases arising under the EHA highlight this problem. For example, in Keech
v. Berkeley Unified School District, 210 Cal. Rptr. 7 (Ct. App. 1984), the plaintiff parents
complained that their child's psychiatric problems were negligently diagnosed. They therefore
sought damages for the additional hospitalization costs, attorney's fees, and emotional distress
alleged to have resulted. Aware of California precedent disallowing recovery under common law
negligence for educational injuries, plaintiffs sought damages under both the EHA and the
California Education Code. The court's summary rejection of plaintiff's claim was not properly
sensitive to the injury suffered; an injury which differs little from the type of harm often seen in
an action for medical malpractice. See Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd,
475 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1984); see also infra part W.A.
A particularly vexing problem is presented where mechanisms do exist within a school district
that might cure a problem, but either the parents or the school officials fail to take advantage of
them. This situation might arise from parental ignorance, official laxity, or from some
combination of the two. Again, failures in the communications between and among those
responsible may create or exascerbate the problem. As will be shown throughout this Article,
the circumstances under which the injury occurs are of dispcsitive significance under a
representational model.
116. See supra note 47.
117. The provenance of this tradition is the Roman Empire, which placed responsibility for
educating children on the father, or head of the household. The still-current term paterfamilias
testifies to the Roman origin of the concept. See James C. Easterly, Parent v. State: The
Challenge to Compulsory School Attendance Laws, I1 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 83, 84
(1990) (citing J. THOMAS, ROMAN LAW, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS 13 (1968)).
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education was not provided until well after the United States was
formed.1 18
Compulsory education laws were followed, in due course, by legal
challenges to the states' rights to control the education of children.11 9
These challenges forced the Supreme Court to adjust the balance
118. The responsibility for educating children clearly falls to the several states (and to the
parents), not to the federal government. The right to an education is nowhere mentioned in the
Federal Constitution, and public education was the exception rather than the rule in the early
days of the Republic. See State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 531 (Minn. 1985). In Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court sketched out the development of public
education in the United States, which did not begin until the nineteenth century. Id. at 489 n.4.
119. The best-known of these challenges eventually came before the Supreme Court, but state
courts had taken up the cause long before. The early decisions reveal, for the most part, an
extraordinary deference to the rights of parents that is startling to the contemporary reader. It is
perhaps not too much to say that parents were permitted to micromanage their children's
education; they could refuse, for example, to allow the child to study certain subjects. See, ag.,
Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874), in which a parent's decision not to allow his son to study
geography was permitted by the court to override the inclusion of that subject among the
required curriculum: "[W]e can see no reason whatever for denying to the father the right to
direct what studies, included in the prescribed course, his child shall take." Id. at 64. But in
stating that the parent's right to control the education of his (for these decisions spoke of the
father) child must be given effect, even to the point of working idiosyncratic changes in the
course of study, the court failed to consider the irresolvable conflict thereby created between
educational policy-makers and parent. Again, from Morrow:
mhe school board [has the statutory power] to make all needful rules and regulations for
the organization, gradation and government of the school, and power to suspend any pupil
...

for non-compliance ...

and it is not proposed to throw any obstacle in the way of the

performance of these duties. But these powers and duties can be well fulfilled without
denying to the parent all right to control the education of his children.
Id. at 66. How is the conflict to be resolved? Perhaps the courts were simply not yet comfortable
with accomodating the rising state interest in education with the traditional view that the parents
were responsible. See also Trustees of Schs. v. People ex rel Van Allen, 87 Ill. 303 (1877) (issuing mandamus to compel school trustees to admit candidate to high school who had passed
entrance examinations in all subjects but grammar, which his father did not want him to study);
School Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 103 P. 578 (Okla. 1909) (child's parents could keep child
out of singing lessons; state constitution gave board of education right to prescribe a course of
study, but not the absolute power to require study of all branches in opposition to parental
wishes). But see State v. Webber, 8 N.E. 708, 713 (Ind. 1886) (giving short shrift to the father's
naked assertion that the study and practice of music was not in the best interest of his son, the
Supreme Court of Indiana stated: "The arbitrary wishes of the [father] must yield and be
subordinated to the governing authorities of the school... and their reasonable rules and regulations for the government of the pupils .... ").
Unlike the state court cases, those that the Supreme Court considered involved a true conflict
between deeply held family values and the school system's perceived requirements. The interference with curricular decisions present in the above cases did not come before the Court. See, e.g.,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (state exceeded its powers in denying access to public schools
for children of illegal aliens); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state exceeded its powers
in applying its compulsory education statute to Amish children beyond the eighth grade); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (suggesting in dictum that the state enjoyed broad
regulatory authority regarding schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state exceeded
its powers in enacting a law forbidding the teaching of any language other than English until the
student had completed the eighth grade).
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between permissible state regulation, on the one hand, and parental
interest in educating their children according to their own beliefs, on

the other. 120
Confusion has beset this judicial enterprise. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court and the state courts have made clear that the state has
wide latitude with regard to the educational mission. It may require
children to attend school, and may impose regulations, if clear and
reasonable, upon those parents who choose to educate their children at
home. 121 Nonetheless, limits on the state's authority remain. In Wis120. These cases have spawned a good deal of rhetoric on the obligations and interests of the
parent and the state, and on the interest of the child. A "sampling" of such pronouncements
follows, but these statements do not go far toward resolving disputes in particular cases. In
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1982), the Supreme Court's refusal to allow Texas to
exclude from public education the children of illegal aliens was closely linked to its perception
that the children were victims who should not be made to suffer for their parents' misdeeds. The
Court found that denial of a right so basic (and necessary) as education would offend the basic
principle that "'legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing.'" Id. at 220 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1972), faced with the complicating factor
of the family's freedom of religion, the Court noted that "a State's interest in universal education,
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests.., and the traditional interest of parents .. " In Blackwelder
v. Safhauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 130-31 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), the district court did an impressive job
of lining up Supreme Court cases that, taken together, stress (1) the importance of an adequate
education to an informed citizenry; (2) the right of the child to be provided with such an
education; and (3) the (sometimes) competing interest of the pare-it, which, especially when
fundamental beliefs are involved, are also to be accorded substantial weight. If these cases stand
for anything, it is that the weighing is difficult.
121. In reaching their decisions, courts have assumed that the state may require school
attendance and may impose reasonable regulations as to education. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213
("There is no doubt as to the power of a State ... to impose reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (permissible to require
education).
States must, however be properly sensitive to the parents' rights to direct the education of their
children. See eg., Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01 (in annuling a Nebraska statute that forbade
teaching foreign language in the schools until the child had completed the eighth grade, the
Court, by Justice McReynolds, noted that "it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children
education suitable to their station in life" and went on to hold that the statute was an
impermissible attempt by the legislature "to interfere... with the power of parents to control the
education of their own").
Of course, any regulation that the state chooses to impose must be sufficiently clear to give
notice to parents of what is required; otherwise, convictions for v-olating the statute cannot
stand. See, eg., Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 121-28, (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (statute
that required that students receive an education "substantially equivalent to the instruction given
... at the public schools" not unconstitutionally vague); State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60,
63-65 (Iowa 1981) (use of phrase "equivalent instruction by a certified teacher" did not make the
statute unconstitutionally vague); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 532-33 (Minn. 1985)
(striking down statute that required home school teacher's credentials be "essentially equivalent"
to those required of public school teachers).
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consin v. Yoder,12 2 for example, the Supreme Court permitted "the
traditional interest of parents" in the educational and religious
upbringing of their children to prevail over a state statute that
required compulsory education after the eighth grade.123
What emerges from these cases, involving a conflict of interest
between parent and school, is that the responsibility is shared. Such a
"fuzzy" result cannot solve the problem of who bears responsibility for
educational malpractice, but the insight gained from reviewing these
cases can be profitably welded to the representational analysis to suggest an approach. The states, by their own enactment and rigorous
enforcement of compulsory education laws, have declared themselves
responsible for providing at least the ingredients for education. As I
have argued throughout, one such ingredient is information. In the
first instance, the schools must provide parents with sufficient information to enable informed action, so as to arrest incipient injury. 2 Once
provided, such knowledge shifts the focus to the parents, who share

responsibility for education. They must then involve themselves in the
problem-solving process.
One complication may affect this assignment of responsibility.
What if the family is dysfunctional, so that messages sent to the parents do not result in action?125 In this case, the interests of the child
and the school may be on one side, aligned against a negligent, ineffective or absent parent. Otherwise stated, the interest of the child is
paramount, and if the parents cannot or will not advance that interest,
the breach must be otherwise filled.126 But how?
122. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
123. Id. at 219-29.
124. Again, this assumes that the problem in question has not hardened into injury. In some
cases, the injury is immediate, so that the question of "arresting" the harm does not arise. See
infra part IV.
125. Just as parents are on notice of the potential for illiteracy, so too should schools
recognize that many families cannot, or do not, assume a responsible role in the education of
their children. While a determination of whether a given family is unable to participate in the
education of its children can only be made on a case-by-case basis, studies tend to support the
conclusion that children in single parent households receive less education than their two-parent
counterparts. Susan Chira, Making the Grade in College: Major in Table Tennis, N.Y. TIMas,
June 29, 1988, at C4. Furthermore, the number of children in one-parent households is
substantial and on the rise. In 1989, the Census Bureau released the following figures: in 1988,
19 percent of white children were in one-parent households, while for black children, the figure
was 54 percent. Both of these figures represented substantial increases from the 1980 figures.
Spencer Rich, Single-ParentFamilies Increase; 54% of Black Children Live in Such Households,
Study Finds, WASH. Posr, Feb. 16, 1989, at A7.
126. Essentially the same point was made by Justice Douglas in his partial dissent in Yoder,
406 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting), in which he rejected the contention that the parents of
Amish children should have the undisputed right to withdraw their children from school after
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Many states now have legislation requiring schools, and other entities, to report possible cases of child abuse to appropriate authorities. 127 By analogy, would it make sense to require follow-up action by
the school where it becomes clear that the parents are not cooperating
with the school to advance their child's education'? To impose such a
responsibility would be to give content to the state's duty to make a
reasonable effort to educate its citizenry. 128 This emphasis on commuthe eighth grade to prepare them for the Amish way of life. Justice Douglas addressed the
possibility of conflicting views between parent and child:
On [the] important and vital matter of education... the children have a right to be heard.
While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the education of the
child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views. He may want to be a
pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer. To do so he will have to break from the Amish
tradition.
Id. at 244-45. Of course, if the child is not learning, any child able to decide the matter would
wish for a different result. In the educational malpractice setting, it is much easier to discover
the best interest of the child than in Yoder, where religious precepts clash with educational goals.
127. These statutes first appeared in the 1970s. They typically require a wide range of people
who come into contact with children to report to the relevant agenz.ies any suspected cases of
child abuse or neglect. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1991), which requires
"any child care custodian" who knows "or reasonably suspects" abuse to report "immediately or
as soon as practically possible" to a child protective agency. Separate sections of the California
Penal Code define "child care custodian" to include trained teachers, § 11165.7, and "child
abuse" to include "neglect." § 11165.6. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
2053-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); MD. FAM. LAW
CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to 705 (Supp. 1991); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.248(1)-(3) (Callaghan Supp.
1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6- 8.9, 9:6-8.10(a) (West Supp. 1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 34.01-02 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 1988).
As drafted, these statutes do not seem broad enough to require reporting parents who fail to
assume responsibility for their child's education. The Illinois statute is typical, defining
"neglect" to include failure to provide food or medical treatment, "or other care necessary for
his or her well-being." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 2053, § 3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991). Although
the latter clause could be interpreted as including parental failure to participate in the education
of their children, the tenor of the statutes suggests that no such application was indicated. Even
statutes such as New York's that include in their definition of neglect, failure to supply
"adequate... education in accordance with the provisions of the education law," N.Y. EDUC.
LAW ART. 65, PART I, are concerned only with the child's attendanoe, not with the adequacy of
parental involvement in the educational process. 48 N.Y. JURISPRUDENCE 2D Domestic
Relations § 1875 (1985). But the New York statute provides a good model for an expansion that
would require the school district to intercede on the child's behalf when reports and
recommendations go consistently unheeded.
This focus on the welfare of the child might avoid results such as that reached in Washington
v. City of New York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1981), in which the father of a violent child
did not cooperate, and in fact obstructed, the district's attempt to evauate and to place the child
in a suitable educational environment. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court properly
disallowed recovery for damages, but the problem that gave rise to the lawsuit-that the child
did not attend school for some 14 months-went unremedied. The court was correct in stating
that the father's failure to pursue adminstrative remedies should not be transformed into a
damages action, but what were the responsible school officials doing during that time?
128. Under standard tort principles, the negligence of the parents might be considered a
superseding cause of the child's injury in such a case, thereby relieving the school of liability.
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nication and involvement by all parties as a way of averting problems
(and suits for educational malpractice) dovetails with the school's
essential mission of providing a setting in which education can
flourish.
IV. RE-EXAMINATION OF EDUCATIONAL INJURY
CASES: CRITICAL APPLICATION OF THE
REPRESESENTATIONAL FOCUS
How can the foregoing focus on representation and communication
in learning assist courts in the determination of cases? When educational malpractice claims are considered within this representational
framework, sensible distinctions between cases are possible. This Article now revisits the educational malpractice cases decided under the
common law.
A.

The New York Cases: Negligence Reconsidered

Because New York has the most developed body of jurisprudence
on what might be called "educational injury," the present section analyzes a host of that state's decisions. It begins with a discussion of a
trio of cases that grappled with the issue of educational malpractice in
the public school setting. Taken together, these decisions provide a
useful vehicle for illustrating the application of a representational
approach. All three were resolved at both the trial and two appellate
levels, so that, taken together, the decisions provide a rich source of
legal debate. Of equal interest, the cases involve vastly different sorts
of facts-differences that may be dispositive under a representational
model.
1.

Claims of FunctionalIlliteracy

Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District'2 9 was the first of
the three, and presented a set of facts and allegations least likely to
engender sympathy, and most likely to arouse judicial fear. Donohue
represents the paradigmatic "functional illiteracy" case, in which a
student alleges, blunderbuss, that the education was deficient in a
130
wholesale way.
Such negligence, however, should not be considered "superseding" if it is foreseeable-which it
is. See KEErON et al., supra note 12, § 44, at 303-11.
129. 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 391
N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
130. Plaintiff alleged that:
[The school system] failed to evaluate the plaintiff's mental ability and capacity ... failed to
provide adequate school facilities, teachers, administrators, psychologists, and other
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As noted in part II.A., the Donohue court held that the plaintiff's
allegations failed to state a claim. Although the court recognized that
a plaintiff might be able to make out the elements of a negligence
claim, recovery was denied on vague "public policy" grounds."'
The court was probably right in disallowing the claim, but for the
wrong reasons. Under a representational model, denial of recovery
would be based on the sobering realities of the schcol system. Schools
operate within budgetary constraints. The quality of teaching is uneven from one school to another (and within a particular school).
Diagnostic tools are difficult to interpret. Each teacher is responsible
for many students, 132 and student ability and motivation play important roles in the success of the educational mission. It is simply not
realistic to argue that schools "hold themselves out" as able to deliver
equipped with skills necessary to sucgraduating classes of students
133
ceed beyond the classroom.
personnel trained . . . failed to teach the plaintiff in such a maner so that he could
reasonably understand what was necessary under the circumstances... [and] failed to adopt
the accepted professional standards and methods ....
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 391
N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
131. See supra part II.A.
132. As the appellate division stated in Donohue: "Public education involves an inherent
stress between taking action to satisfy the educational needs of the individual student and the
needs of the student body as as whole." Id. at 879.
133. Professor Elson focuses on the individual teachers, rather than on the school system as a
whole. In addressing the issue of teacher competence, he is drawn into the discussion of whether
teaching should be accorded professional status. Although a detailed and empirically rich
analysis of the feasibility of holding teachers to a professional standard of care provides little
support for doing so, he states that a similar difficulty attends the work of psychiatrists and
psychologists, who are nonetheless held to a professional negligence standard. Elson discusses a
series of factors that traditionally have been considered in deciding whether to accord a
particular occupation professional status, including public trust and reliance on teachers'
educational judgments. Elson, supra note 6, at 722-32. One can agree with Elson's hedged
conclusion that teachers should be considered professionals, even if that conclusion requires the
questionable assumption that the public relies "upon teachers' educational judgments." Id. at
731. This status, however, tells little about whether, in a particular case, plaintiff was justified in
relying on one or more teachers, or on the school system in general.
Too much ink has been spent on debating whether teachers are professionals. In the first
place, courts and legislatures do, in fact, consider teachers to be professionals, at least when they
aren't worrying about educational malpractice claims. See, eg., Georgia Professional Standards
Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2- 981 to 89 (Michie 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, 24 to 25
(1989) ("School boards may require teachers in their employ to firish from time to time
evidence of continued professional growth.") (emphasis added); Felton v. Secretary, United
States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he City has made sincere and largely
successful efforts to prevent the public school teachersand otherprofessionals whom it sends into
religious schools from giving sectarian instruction .... ) (emphasis added); Rolfe v. County Bd.
of Educ., 282 F. Supp. 192, 199 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) ("Teachers are p:ofessional persons.").
Second, who cares whether teachers are considered professionals? They should be liable for
failing to satisfy the minimum standards of their occupation, as are lawyers, bricklayers, and
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Admittedly, the above argument appears highly cynical. A wellfunctioning educational system is presumably a desideratum, so why
assume to the contrary so as to deny recovery? The short answer to
this criticism is that it confuses description with approval. That
school systems are beset by the above problems is of course a source of
great concern.
More centrally, recognition of the above problems separates the
generic educational malpractice claim from prototypical medical malpractice or product liability claims. If it is difficult to find an implied
representation that schools will deliver a particular package of skills,
then reliance on the educational system is also difficult to make out.
At this point the connection between reliance and causation becomes
apparent. Because parents are not justified in relying on schools, their
conduct in allowing a child to complete a full public education without
having attained the basic tools of literacy and numeracy may break the
causal chain between institutional incompetence and injury to the
child. This principle has two significant, and related, implied limitations, however. First, parents must be equipped with a sufficient quantum of knowledge upon which to act. Second, the school must be
responsive to the parents' concerns. Judicial recourse should be permitted only upon a strong showing that the parental efforts to work
toward a solution were consistently frustrated by the school's inaction.
In Donohue then, as in virtually all functional illiteracy cases, recovery seemingly should not be granted. But it is important to examine
all possible sources of representation. Plaintiff was able to allege that
defendant school system had violated a particular section of the Education Law which required "that each pupil who continuously failed
or who was listed as an 'under-achiever' be evaluated to ascertain the
physical, mental and social causes of the under-achievement and to
further determine if the pupil might benefit from special educational
134
programs."
In the appellate division, the majority and the dissent disagreed on
the effect of this section. The majority stated that the section was not
intended to confer a private right of action upon plaintiff, and that, in
cooks. All of these call for special skill, so that those who engage in any of these careers "are
required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also to possess a standard
minimum of special knowledge and ability." KEnTON et al., supra note 12, § 32, at 185.
Again, though, deciding that teachers are to be held to some standard of competence does not
go far towards deciding what to do when a *student comes through the educational system
without having acquired basic literacy.
134. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 880 (App. Div. 1978),
aff'd, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
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any event, the plaintiff's dismal report cards provided notice to both
him and his parents that he qualified as an "under-achiever" and could
therefore demand the special testing mandated by the statute. Justice
Suozzi's dissent emphasized that the statute was non-discretionary and
imposed upon the school district a responsibility both to test the plaintiff and not to "merely promote [him] in a perfunctory manner from
one year to the next." 135 Although their dispute was not phrased in
terms of reliance on representations, that was in fact the basis bf the
judges' disagreement. The question is whether, by pushing plaintiff
through the grades despite several failures, the school system was
impliedly representing that the skills of literacy and numeracy were
being acquired. Despite the statute, the answer is almost certainly no.
The failing grades should themselves have placed the student, and his
parents, on notice that he was well behind his classmates, and should
have triggered an inquiry long before plaintiff had been graduated and
found himself functionally illiterate and unemployable.
Arguably, the result should be different where the state mandates
that certain minimum scores be achieved on periodic tests before the
student is permitted to advance to the next grade (or subject) level. 136
In those cases, the school district (and perhaps the state) can be found
to misrepresent the student's progress by advancing him or her despite
the unsatisfactory scores. States could presumably avoid this problem
by drafting legislation which makes the testing diagnostic, communicates the child's status to the parent, and makes known a policy of

social promotion. 137
135. Id. at 884 (Suozzi, J.,dissenting).
136. States have begun moving in this direction. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.57 (West
1989), which directs the commissioner of education to implement a program of statewide
assessment testing, and to establish minimum performance standards in core subject areas.
When the Commissioner adopted a plan conditioning receipt of a diploma on the passing of a test
(in furtherance of the statute, which required testing in grades 3, 5, 8 and 11), the predictable
constitutional challenges erupted. See Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981), on
remand, 564 F. Supp. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 730 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to statute, but delaying implementation for period of four years to
cure notice problem). Missouri has enacted similar legislation, empowering the commissioner of
education to insure that all school districts put into place a program of competency testing in
English, reading, mathematics and social studies. Mo. REv. STAT. § 160.257(1) (1991). The
statute further provides that "[d]istrict testing programs may include minimum promotion
standards," id. § 160.257(3), but then goes on to confuse that requirement by adding that the
tests "shall give due consideration to the research on the influence of caltural diversity on testing
performance." Id. Is this latter language fuel for a lawsuit enjoining use of the tests on the
grounds that no such consideration was provided? No reported cases have yet emerged.
137. Of course, this suggestion leaves to one side the important question of whether social
promotion is desirable policy. The observation has been made that rote.promotion of students in
turn creates illiterate college students and employees: "'As long as high schools feel impelled to
graduate everybody who sits patiently in class for four years and colleges act like vacuum
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2.

Negligent Misdiagnosis of ProblemsAffecting Students' Ability to
Learn

The salutary effect of providing full information to the parent or
guardian is nowhere clearer than in cases alleging that a misdiagnosis
of plaintiff's abilities (or disabilities) led to a tragic misplacement and
resulting injury. The alleged malpractice in Hoffman v. Board of Education, 138 presents just such a case. There, an IQ test was administered to plaintiff by a "clinical scientist" who worked for the defendant
school board. Because he scored seventy-four, plaintiff was placed in a
class for the mentally retarded, for which the "cutoff" score was seventy-five. 1 39 The clinical scientist, who determined that plaintiff's low
score was largely attributable to a speech problem, provided the following written evaluation that accompanied the test score: "[Daniel]
needs help with his speech problem in order that he be able to learn to
make himself understood. Also his intelligence should be reevaluated
within a two-year period so that a more accurate estimation of his
abilities can be made."' 14
Plaintiff's mother was told neither that her son had received a score
just one point below the cutoff, nor that the internal rules of the school
administration gave her the right to a retesting. Further, she was not
shown the written evaluation or told of its recommendation of retesting. Such retesting did not in fact occur for some eleven years, at
which time plaintiff's IQ score was in the normal range, at 94. 1T
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff alleged that defendant had been
negligent in testing and subsequently placing him in a class for the
mentally retarded, and in refusing to follow adequate procedures for
the recommended retesting of plaintiff's IQ. Significantly, the injuries
alleged were not of "functional illiteracy;" rather, plaintiff alleged
"mental anguish" at having been classified as retarded.142
A representational model suggests that a different result from that
reached in Donohue may be compelled in Hoffman. Whereas Donohue presents an overall indictment of the school system for a failure to
educate the plaintiff properly, the foundation of the complaint in Hoffcleaners to suck them up, I don't see that this dynamic is going to change ... ' " Carol Innerst,
Three R's: Employers, TeachersAre Blamedfor Students' Low Competence Level, WAsH. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1990, at A3 (quoting Chester E. Finn, Jr., Professor of Education and Public Policy,
Vanderbilt University).
138. 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (App. Div. 1978), rev'd, 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979).
139. Id. at 101. The allegations of the complaint were discussed in detail in the appellate
division, so the citations that follow are from that decision.
140. Id. at 102 (emphasis omitted).
141. Id. at 104.
142. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 319 (N.Y. 1979).
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man is that information highly relevant to a parent's decision on available courses of action affecting her child was withheld, and that the
defendant supplied only part of the story. Such allegations are redolent of negligent misrepresentation, and plaintiffs should at least be
allowed to prove their case. Questions of plaintiff's failure to conduct
further inquiries will, of course, properly be raised by defendant to
diminish or possibly to defeat recovery. But such failure, while relating to the reasonableness of reliance, should not bar recovery on the
theory that no affirmative misrepresentations were made. The special
relationship between the school, acting in loco parentis,and the family
gives rise to a duty to disclose. 4 3
The final case in the "New York trilogy," Snow v. State,'44 presents
a still stronger case for the plaintiff, both sympathetically and analytically. There, plaintiff was a deaf child who, like Hoffman, was given
an IQ test that could not take into account his infirmity. Based on the
results of that test, plaintiff was placed in state institutions for the
retarded, where he remained for a total of some nine years. During
that time, his IQ was tested only once more. The record was replete
with statements by plaintiff's teachers to the effect that he was "very
bright," "functioning at a level which is well above mental retardation," and did "not belong at ... any .
school for the mentally
145
retarded."
143. In a few cases, courts appear to have adopted this position, without recognizing the
failure to disclose as the basis of their holding. For instance, in B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425
(Mont. 1982), the Montana Supreme Court, in the course of becoming the only state court to
recognize an action for educational malpractice, noted that the foster mother was not apprised of
the placement of her child in a special classroom until some nine weeks had passed. Also, in
Village Community School v. Adler, 478 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (Civ. Ct. 1984), a New York City
Civil Court judge focused on the nature of the representations that a private school had made to
the student's mother; namely, that the faculty "could identify and individually treat children
with learning disabilities." In effect, the court was saying that if the school knew, at the time of
contracting, that it could not deliver the promised services, its affirmative misrepresentations (or
omissions to disclose problems that would impede fulfillment of the promise) were actionable.
Id. at 548. But the court disallowed any claim for negligent misrepresentation. Id.
While AM. suggests that a duty of disclosure inheres in the school/parent/student
relationship, Adler, constrained by New York precedent, requires an independent, contractual
basis. But why should a contract be required? Why should not the courts find the same sort of
special relationships in the educational context as they have been consistently willing to find as
between doctor and patient, lawyer and client; indeed, as between any two people who are in a
fiduciary relationship? See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 76, § 9-20, at 369 ("If there is a
fiduciary or confidential relation between the parties, there is a duty of disclosure.").
144. 469 N.Y.S.2d 959 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd, 475 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1984).
145. Id. at 960-61. As was true with both Donohue and Hoffman, the appellate division's
holding provides the most detail regarding the allegations of the complaint, and is therefore used
most often herein. The court detailed several observations that had been made by those
responsible for plaintiff's education and treatment. The first such observation was made when
plaintiff was five, two years after he had been institutionalized. Two further observations were
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The trial judge146 found that plaintiff's prolonged detention in institutions and "educational" programs manifestly unsuitable for him
were caused by negligence in initial evaluation and "inordinate delay
in re-evaluating his true level of intelligence." 14 7 Such negligence
would, of course, be traceable to staff psychologists and teachers, thus
imposing vicarious liability on the state. 4 The appellate division did
not quarrel with the court of claims' determination that the state had
been negligent, but was faced with the consistent unwillingness by the
court of appeals to countenance claims of educational malpractice.
The court found the case distinguishable from Hoffman principally
because there was no evidence of initial misdiagnosis in that case and
because the "failure to have re-evaluated Daniel Hoffman's intelligence constituted a justifiable exercise of judgment in view of his
teacher's [sic] daily observations .
,,.49 Here, by contrast, the record revealed that plaintiff's teachers had, in fact, made observations
impugning the accuracy of the original diagnosis, and that the state
had discovered plaintiff's deafness. Thus, failure to re-test "constituted a discernible act of medical malpractice ...rather than a mere
15
error in judgment vis-a-vis claimant's educational progress.'9
Perhaps surprisingly, these attempts at distinguishing Hoffman
apparently impressed the court of appeals, which tersely affirmed the
decision, and upheld plaintiff's claim. Presumably the court believed
that casting the claim as one involving medical, rather than educational, malpractice, avoided the problems raised in the earlier cases.
But it is difficult to see why the judgments in Hoffman should be any
less subject to judicial scrutiny than those in Snow. In each case, persistent failure in judgment by educators, rather than by psychologists
or doctors, were alleged to have led to the injuries suffered.1 51 The
court of claims in Snow, by stressing the institutional differences
between traditional public schools and state institutions for the menmade in an unsigned memorandum jointly written by plaintiff's teacher and a staff pyschologist
sometime during his two-year stay at a second institution.
146. Because the claim was brought against the state, it was initially considered by the New
York Court of Claims, which sits without a jury. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 9 (Consol. 1988).
147. Snow, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
148. Id. at 963.
149. Id. at 964.
150. Id.
151. It is frequently stated that professionals, such as doctors, are not liable for "mere errors
in judgment." Elson, supra note 6, at 733 n.353 and cases cited therein. But an error in
judgment can only be made if the professional has sufficient knowledge.upon which to act. Thus,
professionals may be liable for failing to arm themselves with such knowledge, thereby leading to
a "failure to exercise any professional judgment." Snow, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
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tally retarded, 5 2 actually put forth a more persuasive rationale for
permitting recovery than did the appellate division, although a representational theory was not expressly used. The court of claims focused
on the mission of the two institutions in which plaintiff had been
detained in finding that the malpractice was miedical, rather than
educational:
This finding is substantiated by the very nature of the Willowbrook
State School. The patients are under continuous treatment. They
receive continuous medical, as well as, psychological treatment. Even
Willowbrook's records, belie the State's assertion that it is merely a
school ....
[I]t is clear that [Claimant's Exhibit '1'] is a hospital or
medical and not a school record. Also, the payment
for Donald's treat1 53
ment was made under his father's medical plan.
While the court of claims can be criticized for attaching totemic
significance to the form of malpractice, some of the facts to which it
directed attention are significant within the context of a representational theory. In particular, during his nine-year institutional confinement, plaintiff had little contact with his parents, who relied upon the
state to educate (to the extent believed possible) and treat their son.
Moreover, the repeated observations, by both teachers and psychologists, that plaintiff was of above average intelligence were not communicated to his parents.
These facts suggest a comparison to actionable medical malpractice,
in which a patient may be relatively helpless, either because of a lack
of information or simply because the exigencies of treatment do not
permit an exchange of relevant information in the first place.
Consider, also, the similarity between Snow and the paradigm products liability case discussed earlier. Because of the vast informational
advantage defendant enjoys over plaintiff, plaintiff is more or less helpless to protect herself or himself, and must rely upon defendant to do
so, either by manufacturing a safe product, or (as here) by supplying
sufficiently detailed information so as to enable a real choice. When
injury results from defendant's dereliction of such duties, the closed
circuit justifying recovery has been established. 5
152. In support of its conclusion, the court of claims cited then section 120 of the Mental
Hygiene Law which listed both of the institutions in which plaintiff was detained as "State
Institutions for mental defectives," and stated the function of such institutions as including "the
care, treatment, training and education of the mental defectives of the state .... " Id. at 961 n.*.
Of course, the language of the foregoing section does not answer the question of how best to
characterize the malpractice.
153. Id. at 961 (quoting from the decision by the court of claims).
154. See supra part III.B.
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In Snow, of course, it was open for the State to argue that plaintiff's
parents should have monitored their son's condition more diligently,
and that the prolonged period of detention weakens the analogy
between this case and one brought for more traditional medical malpractice. Even if these claims are valid, however, they are properly
raised as defenses, and cannot operate to bar the claim.
B.

FurtherApplications of the RepresentationalModel: Express
Representations, Contract,and State Statutory Duties

The criticisms levelled against the cases above apply with still
greater force to cases involving expressly assumed (contractual) and
statutory duties. Consider Torres v. Little Flower Children's Serv15 involving claims for both breach
ices,"
of contract and negligence.
When plaintiff was seven, he was abandoned and placed in the care of
the New York City Department of Social Services (DSS), which, pursuant to statute, accepted responsibility for his care. DSS, in turn,
placed plaintiff with defendant Little Flower Children's Services, a
state-authorized child care agency. The agency assumed a contractual
obligation" 6 to provide for the arrangement, as needed, of" 'religious
training, education and vocational training.' ""7 As the dissent
pointed out, the contract also required Little Flower to provide services in accordance with applicable statutes, rules and regulations of
various state welfare agencies. 5
Because defendant's successful motion for summary judgment precluded full development of the facts, comprehensive knowledge of
plaintiff's problems is hard to come by. Nonetheless, for purposes of
the appeal, the court assumed that partially because of a language
problem, plaintiff had difficulty in learning how to read. Accordingly,
he underwent a psychological study that determined him to be of
"borderline retarded" intelligence (although he was performing at his
grade level in mathematics).
Plaintiff was nonetheless permitted to remain in a regular classroom, as Little Flower "felt that the public school was equipped to
deal with this type of learning disability."15' 9 Moreover, defendant did
not attempt to provide supplemental reading instruction. Five years
after the psychological test was administered, Little Flower took plain155. 474 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984).
156. Although the contract was between DSS and Little Flower, it was agreed that plaintiff
was a proper third-party beneficiary of that contract. Id. at 225, 230.
157. Id. at 224.
158. Id. at 230 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 224 (majority opinion).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 67:349, 1992

tiff to a reading specialist for a further evaluation to be used in establishing a program for plaintiff after his graduation from eighth grade.
The specialist determined that plaintiff was not retarded, but suffered
from a complex learning disability extremely difficult to remedy.
Nonetheless, he recommended a certain method of dealing with plaintiff's problems. This recommendation went unheeded. Little Flower
provided tutoring for plaintiff, but only for a short time."6
Plaintiff did not advance beyond the ninth grade, and subsequently
brought suit alleging that the negligence and breach of contract by
DSS and Little Flower resulted in his functional illiteracy. Significantly, the suit originally named the Board of Education and the
grammar school principal, but these parties were subsequently
dropped. 6 1 Presumably, plaintiff's attorney was trying to avoid close
comparison between this suit and Hoffman.
The shift in parties and in theory did not impress the court of
appeals. In a four to three decision, the court held that the same considerations of public policy that had driven the results in the earlier
cases squarely alleging educational malpractice applied with equal
force where the responsibilities of a legal custodian were in question.
In either case, the court held, judicial involvement would result in
impermissible interference in the policy decisions that educators must
constantly make.

162

This decision is surely in error. Plaintiff was not complaining,
except incidentally, of the decisions of the educational institutions
involved. Rather, he argued that the defendants' failure to monitor
those decisions was actionable. Indeed, the defendants had rights to
administrative reconsideration of the educators' decisions, but did not
avail themselves of these. The defendants' failure to take adequate
steps to protect a child entrusted to them violated statutory duties, a
common law duty, and, in the case of Little Flower, contractual obligations as well.
While the decision is perhaps palatable on its facts (because the
steps the agencies took in assisting the child may have been reasonable), the result of the court's decision is that the helpless child is without any remedy at all. The educational institution is essentially
immune from suit, and the custodian can then use the court's reluctance to recognize any claims arising from negligence in the educa160.
because
at 225.
161.
162.

It is more accurate to state that the plaintiff stopped attending the tutoring sessions
they were conducted at a location that required a 45 minute walk in each direction. Id.
Id.
Id. at 226.
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tional process to insulate itself from liability that it should properly
163
bear.
The representational model requires a different approach. Although
the school board (and individual educators) might be able to point to
the availability of administrative review of the board's decisions as a
prerequisite to judicial involvement, plaintiff cannot then be whipsawed by the custodian's failure to take advantage of those same remedies. By agreeing to act as custodian for a ward of the state, one
represents, often expressly, that one will at least protect the child's
best interests. Failure to do so should be actionable."M
Of course, the presence of a guardian in Little Flower makes the case
both different and in some ways easier than the typical educational
malpractice case. Yet the special concerns implicated by an express,
consensual agreement, as in Little Flower, have broad application to
the private school setting. That setting may strengthen the case for
recovery, because of a possible additional layer of express
representations.
In Paladinov. Adelphi University,165 for example, parents of an elementary school student sued his private school under breach of contract and misrepresentation theories. The student was enrolled in the
school from the nursery level through fifth grade. While in fifth grade,
the student's learning problems prompted his parents to have him
independently tested. The tests showed that the student was several
grades below level in central learning areas, and the school subsequently validated that assessment by refusing to promote him to the
sixth grade. Plaintiffs thereupon enrolled their son in public school,
and brought suit against the private institution. The complaint alleged
that the school "breached its agreement by failing to provide quality
163. The court did state, in passing, that the liability of the agency might be expanded if the
contract expressly so provided. Id at 227. Given the majority's shrink-wrap reading of the
contract, however, it is doubtful that plaintiffs will be able to prevail under this theory, either. A
similar approach was evident in the appellate division's holding in Paladino v. Adelphi Univ.,
454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982). See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
164. It may be thought that this principle also requires liability on the part of parents who fail
to act in their child's best interests, as by failing to take advantage of available administrative
remedies. Certainly the child's lack of power vis-a-vis his or her parents is evident. Other
considerations, such as the need to accord parents maximum flexibility in child-raising, may
somewhat counterbalance the urge to impose liability here. Another problem, explored in supra
part III.D, is that, at least after a period of time, the school may be properly charged with notice
that a family is dysfunctional, so that the school may incur an obligation to act.
In any event, the connection between the liability of a parent and that of a state agency can be
overemphasized. After all, by agreeing to take a child into its care, a state-approved agency
assumes certain contractual obligations that are (probably) missing in the parent-child context.
Those contractual obligations fit within the representational model being advanced here.
165. 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982).
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education, qualified and expert teachers, [and] necessary tutorial and
supportive skills." 166 Also alleged were causes of action purportedly
sounding in both negligent misrepresentation and deceit.
Constrained by the unambiguous holdings of the New York Court
of Appeals in Hoffman and Donohue, the appellate division reversed
the trial court's denial of summary judgment. The court noted that
recognition of a claim for breach of contract would yield the very
result New York courts had feared in the negligence context-judicial
and implementation of educasecond-guessing of the establishment
1 67
methodology.
and
tional policy
The court then turned to the claims of misrepresentation and found
that these fared no better, but for different reasons. Although the
complaint apparently was inartful in separating the claim of negligent
misrepresentation from that of deceit, the former was bottomed on the
more general "promise" of the school to deliver an education superior
to that available in public school, while the deceit claim centered on
the school's alleged failure to keep parents infoirmed on their son's
progress for the purpose of keeping him enrolled. 6 8
The claim sounding in deceit appears to have been rejected only
because the facts established during discovery "fail[ed] to bear out the
claim that the school made false representations to the parents."1 6 9 In
short, the parents' allegations that the school had failed to keep them
apprised of their son's learning difficulties were simply untrue, and the
court chronicled the storm signals that periodically had been sent

home. 170
As to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court summarily
stated that such claims "ought not be actionable." 171 The court's
rejection of that claim, although not explained, may well have been
justified by the principle that a misrepresentation requires more than
' as well as by the hard facts of the case. Promises to
mere "puffing," 172
deliver "a greater education.., than that offered by the school system
in the ... community," and to deliver an education "of the highest
quality" are not taken as affirmative representations by reasonable
166. Id. at 870.
167. Id. at 870-72.
168. The claim for deceit also alleged reliance: "[lit is claimed that these representations were
made with the intent to deceive plaintiffs in order to keep [their son] enrolled at the school and
that plaintiffs relied upon such representations by continuing [his] matriculation." Id. at 874.
169. Id. at 875.
170. Id. at 874-75.
171. Id. at 874.
172. See, e.g., Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853 (2d Cir. 1918).
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people.1 73 Furthermore, the promise to provide "personalized and
individualized instruction in the basic academic skills when required"
was met.174 It is fair to say that, in light of the generality of the allegations, the complaint could just as easily have been made against a public school.
Nonetheless, judicial reluctance to validate claims of negligent misrepresentation may lead to unjust results in other cases. If, for example, a private school represented itself as having a certain student/
teacher ratio, and that ratio were greatly exceeded, no reason appears
why a claim should not be permitted, both on contractual and representational grounds. Presumably, the court's fear of permitting any
claim sounding in negligence accounts for its lack of analysis here.175
One of the court's comments, however, did hint that recovery might
be possible under certain circumstances. The court suggested that the
private school setting may justify a breach of contract claim where
"certain [contractually] specified services, such as . . . a designated
number of hours of instruction" were promised but not delivered. 7 6
The New York court's holding was buttressed by the decision in the
Maryland case of Hunter v. Board of Education,177 in which that
state's supreme court refused to allow plaintiffs to avoid dismissal by
characterizing what was essentially a malpractice claim as a breach of
contract action. There, the parents of a grade school student brought
suit against the local school board, the school principal, a board
employee who had diagnosed the student, and the student's sixthgrade teacher. The complaint stated a wide range of allegations,
including negligent misdiagnosis, intentional misrepresentation 178 and
demeaning the child.
Borrowing heavily from the logic and language of the New York
and California cases denying recovery in cases alleging educational
malpractice, the court upheld the lower court's dismissal of those portions of the claim that smacked of negligence, but reinstated that por173. Paladino,454 N.Y.S.2d at 873 -74.
174. Id. at 874-75.
175. Accord Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1980).
There, in a terse per curiam opinion, the First Department of the Appellate Term of the Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of a cause of action for educational malpractice against a private
school. Reliance was placed upon Judge Wachtler's concurring opinion in Donohue v. Copiague
Union School District, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (N.Y. 1979), in which he noted the daunting
problem of proving causation in such cases.
176. Paladino,454 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
177. 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982).
178. Id. at 583 (by "furnish[ing] false information to [the parents] concerning the student's
learning disability").
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Predictably, the
tion alleging intentional misrepresentation. 179
dissenting opinion likened educational malpractice claims to claims
against other professionals, and therefore saw no reason to deny that
class of actions. 180
Although the court did not expressly focus on representation and
reasonable reliance, these considerations infused the holding. The
court emphasized the availability and superiority of administrative
remedies, noting that the legislature had spoken in favor of "these and
similar informal measures."' 8'1 Under a representational model, such
procedures are indeed of importance, but not just because the legislature has so decreed. The point can be illustrated by returning to the
medical malpractice case. When one is injured by negligence on the
operating table, a state may have administrative procedures providing
for the imposition of discipline against the doctor.' 2 However, no one
seriously suggests that the availability of such a procedure should bar
the injured party from judicial recovery. The reason is clear enough.
Administrative procedures cannot make the injured person whole. At
the time of the negligent diagnosis, treatment, or operation, the patient
is typically helpless. 83 An administrative procedure that attempts to
correct the situation that has led to the patient's mistreatment simply
comes too late.
179. The court stated that it "in no way intend[ed] to shield individual educators from
liability for their intentional torts. It is our view that where an individual engaged in the
educational process is shown to have wilfully [sic] and maliciously injured a child entrusted to his
educational care, such outrageous conduct greatly outweighs any public policy considerations
which would otherwise preclude liability so as to authorize recovery." Id. at 587.
180. Id. at 588-89.
181. Id. at 586.
182. For example, Florida's comprehensive physician disciplinar) statute sets forth some 38
separate grounds for action against physicians, including: "Gross or repeated malpractice or the
failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a
reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and
circumstances." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)(t) (West 1991). Tie statute also sets forth a
wide range of disciplinary actions that can be taken if the grounds for action are substantiated.
These include "[r]evocation or suspension of a license" or "[r]efund of fees billed to and collected
from the patient." Id. § 458.331(2). But the patient wants (and i3 entitled to) more than a
refund.
183. Such helplessness is hard to dispute when the negligence takes place on the operating
table. More difficult cases are presented in areas such as informed consent, where it may be
argued that the patient can ask for the information needed. See RICHARD A. EPSTIN,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE CASE FOR CONTRACT 27-34 (1979). Even here, though, the
physician's superior knowledge and the intimidation that many patients experience argue
persuasively for a duty to disclose, bottomed again on the patient's basic lack of power. See
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Duty to disclose.., is a duty to
volunteer, if necessary, the information the patient needs for intelligent decision. The patient
may be ignorant, confused, overawed by the physician or frightened by the hospital, or even
ashamed to inquire.").
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In contrast, the types of injury that ground most educational malpractice claims occur over a period of time. A student does not
become functionally illiterate because of one specific act. Even where
an act of negligent misdiagnosis causes a gross misplacement of the
student, prompt correction of the situation may prevent injury.
Where adequate administrative procedures are in place, these may
provide a superior alternative to the time-consuming judicial process.
To return to an earlier example, if the parents have the right-and are
so informed-to a re-evaluation of a child diagnosed as needing special
education, such re-evaluation can prevent the injury before it occurs.
Thus, state-sponsored administrative procedures are indeed significant, not because they can fairly be interpreted as trumping the judiciary, but because they can have the salutary effect of rendering resort to
it unnecessary.
The logic of the above distinction suggests its own limits; limits that
were impliedly recognized by the court in Hunter. The court correctly
noted that intentional acts, including misrepresentation and something
84
akin to intentional infliction of emotional distress were actionable.1
This holding is plainly correct, as an intentional wrong places the
plaintiff in the same helpless position as the patient injured by medical
1 85
malpractice.
The consistent imposition of liability for negligent supervision of
students resulting in physical injury can also be accomodated by an
emphasis on representation and reliance. Where the school's negligent act causes immediate physical harm to a student, the obvious
helplessness of the student closely parallels that of the patient injured
by the negligently performed operation, or that of a consumer injured
by a defectively manufactured product, and recovery should be possible. Indeed, courts consistently recognize claims for inadequate supervision leading to personal injury. The interesting question in these
cases is whether the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances, with due regard for the role of the educator.
Consider, for example, Berg v. Merricks.18 6 There, a Maryland
appellate court writing before Hunter assumed that physical education
184. Hunter, 439 A.2d at 583 (defendant was alleged to have provided plaintiffs with false
information, to have "alter[ed] school records to cover up their actions," and to have
"demean[ed] the child").
185. Of course, where a wrong can be administratively corrected before the student is
harmed, a court may properly require that such procedures be exhausted before resort to its own
offices. Such administrative procedures may have the desired effect of placing a school board's
conduct under scrutiny, and of providing a plaintiff with a chance to convince the authorities of
the need for special or proper placement, before the questioned action ripens into injury.
186. 318 A.2d 220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
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teachers owe their charges a duty of care in terms of discretion,
instruction, and supervision. In Berg, a student became paralyzed as a
result of poor execution of a trampoline exercise. In reviewing the
trial judge's grant of directed verdicts for the physical education
teacher and the school principal, the court assumed the presence of a
duty. It also fixed the duty of care owed by the physical education
instructor as the standard recognized in the teaching of high school
gymnastics.1 8 7 However, a review of the evidence persuaded the court
that no negligence had actually taken place, and the directed verdicts
18
were therefore upheld. 1
V.

REPRESENTATIONAL FOCUS: EXTENDED
APPLICATIONS

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that representational notions
are at work in other areas of tort law, as well as in the educational
setting. Also, a proper focus on communication and reasonable reliance can animate the decisional law of educational malpractice, even
though that term encompasses claims arising out of many different
facts and legal theories.

In this final section, the representational light shines on two other
classes of cases that, frankly, have little to do with each other. But
this very dissimilarity supports a pervasive emphasis on representation
and reliance.
A.

Applying the RepresentationalModel to the Education of the
HandicappedAct

As noted earlier, the class of students designated as "handicapped"
by the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) begin their lawsuits
on surer footing than those who seek recovery trader a common law
theory, because the statute itself establishes the duty that courts otherwise have been loath to find. This ab initio advantage has spurred
some injured parties to attempt to mix statutory and common law
claims for relief.'8 9 For the most part, however, courts have been
stingy when it comes to awarding damages under the statute, and have
187. Id. at 227.
188. Id. at 223. Negligence had been charged against the physical education teacher, the
principal, the school superintendent, the county, the school board, and individual board
members. The court found, as a matter of law, that none of those who were proper parties to the
suit were negligent, and that the others (the school board and its members, and the county) were
immune from suit.
189. See, e.g., Daniel B. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 581 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wisc.
1984); Johnson v. Clark, 418 N.W.2d 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
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not permitted plaintiffs to invoke common law theories, principally
negligence, to collect the full damages they seek. t9 0
This Article now turns to a consideration of claims arising under
the ERA. One might begin by asking why this Article discusses the
EHA at all, inasmuch as the statute speaks for itself. The response is

that courts faced with educational malpractice claims not brought
under the EHA could learn valuable lessons from the statute. The
statutory scheme, with its emphasis on communication between parent
and school authorities, its administrative procedures, and its ultimate
resort to the judiciary, is generally consistent with a representational
perspective. Further, as suggested above, the EHA also merits treatment because of plaintiffs' repeated attempts to join claims under the
EHA with other theories of recovery.
As noted earlier, the statute requires that the relevant authoritytypically the local school board-first identify, then take steps to provide, an "appropriate" education to handicapped children."9 Devis-

ing such a program involves working up an "individualized education
program" for the student, tailored to that student's idiosyncratic
needs. In an ideal situation, the statute provides incentive for school
officials and parents to enter into agreements concerning the child's
education. 192
Where such agreement is not reached, or where the parents are
otherwise dissatisfied with the district's decision, the statute provides a
grievance procedure designed to resolve those differences. The right to
judicial redress follows this grievance procedure.1 93 As stated in part
II.C., this layered method of dealing with placement questions is pref190. In Johnson v. Clark, 418 N.W.2d 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), the court used just such a
one-two punch to disallow plaintiff's common law and statutory claims. In a textbook example
of circular reasoning, the court first stated that no common law duty to teach properly existed
and then, without considering plaintiff's arguments that such a duty should be recognized, the
court dismissed the damages claim arising under the Education of the Handicapped Act with the
observation that, since Congress did not intend for the statute to provide a private cause of
action, there could be no "common-law duty to test and evaluate special education students apart
from the duties already imposed by statute." Id. at 468.
191. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
192. Cases in which such agreements have been reached are hard to come by for the obvious
reason that the agreements themselves render litigation unnecessary. Sometimes, however,
agreements are initially struck, but then collapse because of changed circumstances, which may
include a new intransigence on one party's part. See, eg., Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 802-03
(Ist Cir. 1982), on remand, 561 F. Supp. 121 (D.C. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.
1984), in which the parents of a child with Down's Syndrome and the school district forged an
agreement whereby the cost of residential placement would be shared by parents and school.
The agreement disintegrated, however, when the parents subsequently requested a full reevaluation of their son's status.
193. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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erable to allowing a problem to mushroom to the point where the
harm done is irreversible. The statute reflects this wisdom by implicitly requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing
94
suit. 1
Typically, suits under the EHA seek only declaratory or injunctive
relief; in effect, they ask the court to second-guess the placement decision reached by the school officials.' 95 An interesting question arises
when the complaint also seeks damages. The problem in deciding
whether to recognize a damage claim under the EHA is that the statute is itself ambiguous, providing that the court is empowered to grant
such relief as it deems appropriate. Literally construed, this language
would support the awarding of damages. Focus on the purposes of the
statute, however, has led many courts to decide that, absent exceptional circumstances, "appropriate relief" is limited to overruling the
adminstrative agency's placement decision.
Exceptional circumstances have been defined as including two paradigm situations: The physical well-being of the student would be jeopardized unless the parents take some action; or the school district
acted in bad faith by refusing to follow (or delaying) established procedures or by wilfully misplacing the student. Even faced with such circumstances, however, courts typically allow recovery only for out-ofpocket expenses incurred as a direct result of the district's malfeasance. Examples include cost of transportation, reimbursement for
private tuition, and (perhaps) cost of services.' 9 6
DanielB. v. Wisconsin Departmentof Public Instruction 9 7 provides
a nice illustration of the operation of the statute. In DanielB., parents
brought suit under the EHA, the due process clause of the Fourteenth
194. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988) (grants the right to bring a civil action only to those
aggrieved by the findings of the relevant educational institutions).
195. See, eg., Diamond v. McKenzie, 602 F. Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1985) (granting permanent
injunction, requiring placement of child in certain program); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171,
240-41 (D.N.H. 1981) (granting injunctive relief to class action plaintiffs requiring, inter alia,
individually based community placements, appropriate medical services, and decent living
conditions). In Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990), the court stated the general
view that "injunctive or other prospective relief is ordinarily the remedy ... and damages are
usually inappropriate."
196. See supra note 61, discussing Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
For a criticism of the approach taken in Anderson, see Doe v. Brookline School Commission, 722
F.2d 910, 919-21 (Ist Cir. 1983). The Doe court, en route to holding that reimbursing parents
for the interim costs of placement was permissible, cited a number of cases in which other courts
had permitted such reimbursement where the "circumstances were sufficiently compelling." Id.
at 920.
197. 581 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wisc. 1984).
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Amendment,' 9" misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming that the school district failed to provide the
appropriate education for their son's needs, causing him to regress to a
state of semi-autism. They also sought reimbursement for a diagnosis
to reveal these problems, and claimed that defendants had "misrepresented to them that a teacher designated to oversee [the child's] education was a certified special education teacher; and that the defendants

refused to permit [his] parents to observe his classroom conditions or
to furnish information concerning him." 199 Defendants responded
with a motion to dismiss all but the claim that the student's placement
was inappropriate for the most recent year.
The student, identified as handicapped, was enrolled in a private
school during the 1975-76 school year. His parents then moved him
to a public school, allegedly because the Superintendent of Schools
represented to them "that the district had better facilities and personnel to provide an individual program for [him]. Relying upon these
representations, [his] parents enrolled him in the [public] schools in
0

1976.

"120

The parents from time to time objected to the district's allegedly
inadequate or inappropriate treatment of their son's problem, but took
no formal steps until the 1982-83 school year, when they pursued the
proper administrative steps for declaratory relief and damages. They
20
filed the federal action after losing on administrative appeal. 1
198. The due process claims would have been redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), had
the court found them cognizable. The alleged due process violations were as follows: (1) denial
of "information about Daniel's education and the opportunity to observe his education and
progress"; (2) failure to notify the parents of their legal rights and remedies; and (3) failure to
provide the parents with free representation at the administrative hearing. Daniel B., 581 F.
Supp. at 588. The court rejected the premise underlying the third claim, finding that the
Constitution did not require the right to counsel in this circumstance. Id. at 589-90. As to the
others, the court followed the logic of cases such as Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th
Cir. 1981), in which the court ruled that, where the EHA is implicated, that statute itself
provides the exclusive remedy. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1216-17. Inasmuch as the court in Daniel
B. followed the prevailing view that, absent exceptional circumstances, only injunctive relief is
available for violations of the EHA, it was but a short step to the position that no other statute
could be used to supply a damage remedy that the EHA declined to provide. The court then
closed the syllogism by invoking the Supreme Court's more general pronouncement, in
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), that an action under § 1983
is not available "'where the governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations.'"
Daniel B., 581 F. Supp. at 589 (quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 n.ll (1980)). As
discussed infra, this position becomes untenable if the alleged misrepresentations kept the
plaintiffs from pursuing their statutory rights under the EHA until injury had occurred.
199. DanielB., 581 F. Supp. at 587.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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The district court was not sympathetic. As to the request for
declaratory relief, the court held that such a claim was not properly
before it as to any year other than the current one, because of the
parents' failure to seek administrative redress during the years
between 1976 and 1982.202
Invoking the common refrain that the EHA does not support a
right to damages, the court next dispatched that request. Neither of
the two exceptions was met. The child's placement did not raise a
serious risk of injuring him physically and the district had not acted in
bad faith, since it had fully complied with the relevant procedures for
the year in which the parents had gone through the proper
20 3
channels.
Because the district court also dismissed the constitutional claims,
all that remained was the placement decision for the 1982-83 year, and
the pendent state claims for intentional misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2° But the court exercised its
discretion to disallow these state claims, noting that they would
require a jury trial and massive discovery, and that the court would
thereby be drawn into the educational malpractice issue.20 5
The court can be criticized for failing to appreciate the significance
of the claim for intentional misrepresentation. If the basis of that
claim was that the school district intentionally prevented the parents
from acquiring vital information concerning their son's progress, they
may indeed have had a difficult time monitoring that progress, and
may not have realized the extent of the problem for quite some time.
The district's deliberate silence should perhaps itself have triggered
some action on the part of the parents: Again, it is preferable to
attempt resolution of such problems at the earliest time. It might have
been well, however, for the court to have granted plaintiffs leave to
replead, specifying any actions defendants took to keep them in the
dark. In a sufficiently egregious case-as where the defendants provide continued assurances, or misrepresent a teacher's qualifications or
what is going on in the classroom, and then prevent the parents from
verifying these actions-judicial oversight may well be necessary as a
202. Id. at 588.
203. Id. at 590-91.
204. Plaintiffs also claimed invasion of privacy under the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1989). The court also dismissed that claim, holding that the
statute "does not provide private litigants with a damage remedy in a federal court." DanielB.,
581 F. Supp. at 592 (citing Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (8th Cir.
1977)).
205. DanielB., 581 F. Supp. at 591-92.
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deterrent.20 6 Courts would not even need to work a doctrinal change
to achieve such a result, because intentional misconduct on this scale
certainly amounts to bad faith.
It appears that in granting a limited class of damages (where they
allow damages at all), courts are on the right track but have perhaps
not gone far enough. If parents and the school district are acting in
good faith according to the statutory mandate, those mechanisms
should prevent injury. If the district is stonewalling, or misrepresenting essential facts, however, injury will occur until the problem is
remedied.20 7
In such a case, there is no reason not to grant all recovery determined to stem from the conduct that allows a damage award in the
first place. For example, if a deliberate misrepresentation early in a
child's schooling resulted in a lengthy misplacement, why should damages for such misplacement not be recoverable? Such a student might
miss years of appropriate schooling (in defiance of the statutory mandate), and would then presumably suffer both pecuniary (as in lost
wages, and the cost of schooling to compensate for the years lost) and
emotional loss. That parents are sometimes permitted to recover out206. Where the relief sought under the EHA is for damages only, the familiar maxim that
resort to foreseeably futile administrative remedies will not be required should apply, but may
not change the result. Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979), involved an
attempt by a learning disabled minor to recover damages against defendant school board for
negligently failing to implement an appropriate educational program earlier in his school career.
Significantly, the district court did not have before it an equitable action requesting that the
student be placed in a given program, because by the time of the decision the parties had agreed
on an educational program. Rather, plaintiffs sought "one million dollars in monetary damages
for the alleged negligence of the defendants in failing to implement an appropriate educational
program earlier in the plaintiff's school career." Id. at 111.
Since the administrative procedure was "designed only to handle parental challenges to the
evaluation and/or placement of a child suffering from learning disabilities," id. at 112-13, the
court held that exhausting state remedies would be an empty exercise, and therefore would not be
required. This result, however, hardly helped the plaintiffs, for in the next breath the court
disallowed the claim for damages, noting that the Act was "devoid of even the slightest
suggestion that Congress intended for it to serve as a vehicle through which to initiate a private
cause of action for damages." Id. at 114. In so holding, the court relied in large measure on Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in which the Supreme Court set forth four factors to aid in
determining whether Congress intended to create a private damage remedy in a statute not
expressly providing one. These factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for
whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any legislative intent to create or deny
such a remedy; (3) whether implication of a private right of action is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action sought is one
traditionally left to state law. Cor, 422 U.S. at 78.
207. It is also possible, of course, that the parents may be acting in bad faith. In such a case,
even if damages might otherwise be justified under one of the exceptions, they might properly be
disallowed or reduced.
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of-pocket expenses will be little consolation in the face of such staggering injury.
Two objections to the above proposition are apparent. First, awarding damages is inconsistent with the statute's more limited purposes of
ensuring an appropriate educational placement for handicapped students. A related quarrel is that permitting such damages would circumvent the state's express policy of refusing to recognize claims for
educational malpractice. Neither of these objections, now treated seriatim, is compelling.
It may well be that Congress did not expect courts to award damages under the EHA. If so, courts should refuse to allow damage
claims in all cases. Once courts decide to create exceptions, however,
their decision to limit the damages that are recoverable when an
exception is met appears arbitrary.20° Again, in a case involving "bad
faith," the school district should not be able to escape the full respon-

sibility for what its culpable conduct has wrought. If the results are
unpalatable, Congress can always amend the Act.
The second objection is a bit trickier. Setting aside the central point
that courts should recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice, federal courts must not place financial burdens upon state courts
that the states themselves have declined to impose. This argument has
both constitutional and fairness aspects. The Eleventh Amendment
argument has not impressed courts, probably for the reasons set forth
in the margin.2" 9 In response to the more general point that to permit
the recovery of damages against state entities would be to saddle them
with intolerable financial burdens, two observations are offered.
208. See Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 920 (1st Cir. 1983) (criticizing the
"exceptional circumstances" approach that some courts have taken and stating that "[t]hese
exceptions must be based on the premise that [the statute does not create] a complete bar to
reimbursement").
209. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI. What does this mean? As the court stated in Ceis v. Board of Education,
774 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1985), "[i]t is well-settled ... that despite its ... seemingly ambiguous
language, the eleventh amendment constitutionalizes a . . . far-reaching principle of state
sovereign immunity." Id. at 580 (citations omitted).
For a host of related reasons, the Eleventh Amendment is not likely to pose a problem in
educational malpractice suits. First, the amendment applies only to states themselves, not to
subdivisions of the state. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 522 (1890). Typically, it is these
subdivisions, or agents thereof, that are the primary defendants in such suits.
Further, the Eleventh Amendment's immunity is not available where the state officials in
question act beyond their statutory authority, in a manner violative of federal rights. Even
assuming that the relevant parties in suits brought under the EHA qualify as state officials, their
wrongful actions under the Act would presumably take them without the amendment's
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First, the state receives federal funding for the education of its handicapped students only if the conditions set forth in the statute are met.
So, for example, if a state did not wish to draw up individualized educational programs for the students, any program the state might establish for the handicapped would presumably forfeit federal funding. By
the same reasoning, any state unwilling to accept the consequences of
failure to comply with the statutory mandate should also be prepared
to do without federal funding.2 1 °
But more importantly, the very structure of the statute ensures that
liability will not be imposed absent intentional misconduct. The focus
is on diagnosis, communication, and placement, and the grievance
procedure, in which parents are assigned a pivotal role, is designed to
prevent the kind of injury that gives rise to educational malpractice
suits. Bluntly put, any state that finds itself, its agencies, or its
employees liable for a damage claim under the EHA has only itself to
blame.
B.

Claims Involving Injury to Third Parties

Almost all claims arising under the educational malpractice
umbrella allege injury, however caused, to a student attending the
school in question. Additionally, however, there is also a frightening
incubus; a tiny group of cases claiming that an institution's negligent
education of its charges caused injury to a third person who sought the
student's services. It might be alleged, for example, that a medical
school so negligently taught its future doctors that they were illequipped to minister to their patients. A claimant so alleging would
sue both the doctor and the medical school that "miseducated" him or
her.

21 1

These cases, seldom raised and universally rejected, create almost
imperceptible hills on the legal landscape. But judicial analysis has, by
protection. Cf Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (immunity for executive officers
limited to actions taken in good faith).
What's more, the state may waive its immunity. It can be reasonably maintained that, by
accepting federal funding under the EHA, which empowers the court to grant whatever relief it
deems apt, the state is impliedly consenting to a waiver of immunity.
For a comprehensive discussion of the Eleventh Amendment point, see Lester H. v. Gilhool,
916 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1990); Geis v. Board of Educ., 774 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1985).
210. This proposition may smack of "blackmail" to some, just as there were critics of the plan
to withhold federal highway funding from states that did not adopt a drinking age of 21. But 23
U.S.C. § 158 (1988), which provided for the withholding of five percent of state highway funds
for failure to adopt this drinking age, withstood constitutional attack under both the Tenth and
Twenty-first Amendments. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
211. Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986), discussed in detail in this section, is
such a case.
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and large, missed the point in issuing rote dismissals. The same focus
on the communicative, representational aspect of these claims-and
on the injured party's corresponding reliance-that has so far directed
this Article can also inform decisions in these third-party cases.
In Moore v. Vanderloo,21 2 the patient of a chiropractor brought suit
against the chiropractor, Vanderloo, as well as against the manufacturer of an oral contraceptive she had been taking and the chiropractic
college, Palmer College of Chiropractic (Palmer), that Vanderloo had
attended. Vanderloo settled before trial, while Ortho, the manufacturer, won at trial. The portion of the Iowa Supreme Court's decision
of concern for present purposes is the appeal from the granting of
Palmer's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff suffered a debilitating stroke after undergoing chiropractic
manipulation of her neck. At the time, she had been using Ortho's
birth control pill for some ten years.21 3 Although the court's summary of the complaint is somewhat opaque, apparently the combination of birth control pills and chiropractic manipulation allegedly
caused the stroke. The source of Vanderloo's negligence was also
unclear,2" 4 but Palmer College was alleged to have breached an
express warranty running to plaintiff, and negligently failed "to properly research and teach Vanderloo the risk of stroke from chiropractic
manipulation of the neck."2 5
The court promptly characterized the negligence claim as seeking
relief for educational malpractice, and noted that almost all courts
that had considered the tort had rejected it. Recognizing that this case
involved facts far afield from those grounding most other educational
malpractice claims, the court nonetheless parrotted the concerns of
those cases: the difficulty of ascertaining proper teaching methodology; the uncertainty of causation and damages; the unwillingness of
the judiciary "blatantly to interfere with the internal operations and
daily workings of an educational institution"; and refusal
"to interfere
21 6
with legislatively defined standards of competency."
These objections, considered antiseptically, are no more compelling
here than in the more garden-variety educational malpractice claims
212. Id.

213. She had also used another manufacturer's pill for the five years preceding that, and was a
heavy smoker. Id. at I11.
214. It might be that Vanderloo was negligent in the way he manipulated plaintiff's neck, or
in not appreciating the possible synergy between use of birth control pills and stroke, or in failing
to take plaintiff's medical history. The more interesting question here, however, involves the
negligence of Palmer College of Chiropractic.
215. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d at 111.
216. Id. at 114-15.
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already considered, and it seems unnecessary to reiterate this Article's
criticisms here. Two points, however, should be added. First, it is not
suggested that the court interfere with the legislature's licensing function, but judicial recognition that the state has limited resources for
policing ongoing compliance with licensing requirements suggests, if it
does not entail, that supplemental private actions are desirable. Second, the court is correct in noting that there is difficulty in demonstrating causation in these cases, and, we shall see, this difficulty is
bound up with the problem of showing reasonable reliance.
The court's logic in dismissing the express warranty claim was more
sound. The "sources" of the express warranty were the diploma
awarded Vanderloo, which was claimed to "constitut[e] an express
warranty of his competence by Palmer College to the public," and
advertising material provided by Palmer trumpeting the safety of chiropractic manipulation.2 17 This claim was rejected for reasons that
can be accommodated by a representational focus. The Uniform
Commercial Code, which the court applied by analogy, finds an
express warranty only where the seller makes a promise to the buyer
and that promise "becomes part of the basis of the bargain."218
The court then noted that plaintiff was not a "buyer" in relation to
Palmer, and that her admission that she never read any of Palmer's
literature defeated the reliance necessary to establish the warranty as
forming part of the basis of the bargain.21 9 The court justifiably feared
that, absent reliance or privity, recognition of an express warranty
would create vast liability against all educational institutions.2 20
Clearer focus on the representations made by Palmer College, and
the reliance by plaintiff, would have resulted in a more streamlined
decision, but one identical in result. The chiropractor had been graduated from Palmer some four years before the incident giving rise to the
lawsuit. It simply distorts common understanding and common sense
to maintain that patients rely on the degree-granting institution rather
than on the professionals themselves. What if the chiropractor had
forgotten what he had learned? Had failed to keep abreast of recent
developments? Had simply applied too much pressure? The causal
intervention of the doctor (or lawyer, or architect, for that matter) is
217. Id at 112.
218. Id (citing IOWA CODE § 554.2313(l)(a) (1977)) (emphasis omitted).
219. Id.
220. The court declined to consider a related claim arising under implied warranty, since
neither plaintiff's oral arguments nor briefs raised the issue. The court suggested, however, that
its discussion of express warranty "also would seem to apply to an implied warranty theory." Id.
at 113.
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both obvious and enormous, so that it runs counter to reality to maintain that the school was somehow relied upon.
The story does not end so neatly. While reasonable patients rely on
their doctors, in some cases reasonable doctors may, in turn, have
relied on their schools to provide them with the basic tools of "literacy" for their profession. The court in Vanderloo feared this very type
of case. In justifying its dismissal of educational malpractice suits for
third-party injury cases, the court cited the burden that would otherwise be created: "[A]ny malpractice case would have an educational
malpractice action within it. For example, a doctor or attorney sued
for malpractice by a patient or client might have an action over against
his or her educational institution for failure to teach the doctor or
'
attorney how to treat ...the client's problem."221
Vanderloo settled his dispute with Moore, so the possibility of this
"action over" never arose. Where it does arise, this two-tiered system
of liability that the Vanderloo court feared actually seems best to comport with the representations and the (perhaps forced) reliance
involved.
Swidryk v. Saint Michael's Medical Center,2 22 involved just such a
"doctor bites hospital" situation. Plaintiff was a first-year resident
sued for malpractice in connection with the delivery of a baby. He
filed suit against the hospital in which the injury occurred, and against
the Director of Medical Education at the hospital, who was allegedly
"negligent in failing to supervise adequately the intern and resident
program," and who "breached a contractual duty ... by failing to
provide a suitable environment for a medical educational experience." 22 In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court began promisingly by "dispos[ing] of the technical distinctions
between similar causes of action ...to achieve substantial justice."22' 4
The court did less well in the achievement of justice.
The opinion splits neatly into two sections. In the first, the court
simply ran through the myriad justifications that courts have used in
almost uniformly turning away claims for educational malpractice.22 5
In the second, the court recognized that the factual situation before
it differed from that of most educational malpractice cases, but
decided that those differences did not call for a changed result. The
most pointed arrow in the court's quiver was the comprehensive statu221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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tory and regulatory scheme that "New Jersey has enacted... to insure
that proper medical education is provided within the State."22' 6 Simply stated, the court believed that the state legislature's reliance on a
state board of medical examiners, a state board of higher education,
and the advisory graduate medical education council displaced judicial
authority to impose liability on properly licensed institutions.
Under the analysis followed throughout this Article, the result in
this case may well be unfair. The resident most likely had little ability
to affect the conditions under which he labored, and was therefore
compelled to rely on the competence of the hospital's policy-makers.
Interestingly, this helpless position is not entirely dissimilar from that
of the patient undergoing an operation.
Does this mean that the licensing scheme is irrelevant? Perhaps not.
It should be open for the hospital to argue that it was following the
procedures set forth in the applicable regulations, and, if those regulations are sufficiently detailed, perhaps compliance should operate as a
complete defense. Further, if the resident knew of the problems for a
reasonable period of time but did nothing to correct them internally or
to bring them to the attention of the relevant authority, the resident
may move sufficiently far from the "helpless patient" paradigm to justify reducing any recovery on comparative negligence principles. Any
court inclined in this direction should balance the notoriously difficult
conditions under which residents work against their obligation to their
patients to protect them from a situation the residents find unsafe.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because the problems that beset the educational system are woven
into the social fabric, solutions are hard to come by. Legislatures,
removed from the school systems for which they bear responsibility,
can do little more than establish broad boundaries within which the
educational mission is to be carried out. It then devolves upon local
school boards, school officials, teachers, and parents to work out the
"details" for an enlightened education, one that will enable children
one day to assume their place in the national and global society.
Sensitive to the difficulty of the educators' task, courts have almost
universally adopted a "hands off" approach. Better to have those
directly involved in the educational process work toward solutions
than to interpose the divisive judiciary. This approach is tempting,
226. Id. at 644. The court set forth several of the provisions that it believed expressed a
legislative preference to keep the courts out of the daily operations of graduate medical
education.
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but amounts to abdication. Courts must recognize that the disputes
they have broad-brushed as "educational malpractice" take in a spectrum of cases so wide that rote dismissal is unfair.
This Article has attempted to convince the judiciary that proper
attention to representations, often implied, and the forced reliance of
parents and children on those who provide education will sometimes
support recovery for educational injury. This result is neither radical
nor surprising, since it follows from unexceptional (and unexceptionable) tort principles that courts do not otherwise question.
This position is reached with some unease. Permitting private suits
by those who perceive themselves somehow wronged by the educational process may saddle the school systems with additional financial
burdens, at least in the short run. It would be far preferable for the
school, broadly defined, to seek internal solutions to its problems.
But neither schools nor legislatures are solving these problems, so
the judiciary must. The special urgency of judicial action in the educational setting is as clear now as ever:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments .... It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
to succeed in life if
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
22 7
he is denied the opportunity of an education.

227. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).

